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INTRODUCTION**  
In early December 2008, ninety-four states signed the Convention 
on Cluster Munitions (“CCM”) in Oslo, Norway.1 The Convention 
prohibits the use, development, production, stockpiling, and transfer 
of Cluster Munitions (“CMs”)2, defined as “weapon[s] comprising 
multiple explosive submunitions [(i.e., bomblets)] which are 
dispensed from a container.”3  
 
** The American University International Law Review would like to thank Aliyah 
M. Philips, American University Washington College of Law, J.D. Candidate 
2012, for her assistance with the Hebrew language sources in this article. 
 1. Convention on Cluster Munitions, Convention on Cluster Munitions 
Signing Conference, http://www.clusterconvention.org/pages/pages_iv/iv_signing 
conferece.html (last visited May 9, 2010).  For a complete list of all signatories, 
see Convention on Cluster Munitions, Ratifications and Signatures, 
http://www.clusterconvention.org/pages/pages_i/i_statessigning.html (last visited 
May 9, 2010). 
 2. See Convention on Cluster Munitions art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 3, 
2008, Doc. No. CCM/77, available at http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/ 
ENGLISHfinaltext.pdf [hereinafter CCM] (listing the general obligations  of 
signatories regarding cluster munitions).  See generally Priya Pillai, Adoption of 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions, ASIL INSIGHT, Oct. 1, 2008, 
http://www.asil.org/insights081001.cfm (providing a brief overview of the 
convention’s provisions). 
 3. Nout van Woudenberg, The Long and Winding Road Towards an 
Instrument on Cluster Munitions, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 447, 451 (2007) 
(defining submunitions as "munition[s] designed to be dispensed in multiple 
quantities from a container and to detonate prior to, on, or after impact," and 
discussing additional variations  of the definition of CM in the absence of the 
standard definition.); see also Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 2, art. 
2(2) (“‘Cluster munition’ means a conventional munition that is designed to 
disperse or release explosive submunitions.”). 
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The Convention, which will enter into force on August 15, 2010 
following the ratification of thirty countries by mid-February 2010 , 
is the culmination of the “Oslo Process,” under whose heading five 
conferences were held between February 2007 (Oslo, Norway) and 
May 2008 (Dublin, Ireland).4 While only forty-six states originally 
agreed to launch the process and endorse the Oslo Declaration at the 
first conference in February 2007,5 107 states ultimately adopted the 
CCM at the last conference held in Dublin.6 Such agreement 
apparently reflects a dramatic rise in the number of states believing 
that the only guarantee for the prevention of the next humanitarian 
crisis inflicted by this weapon is its total elimination.7 As Germany’s 
Foreign Minister Walter Steinmeier and the British Foreign Secretary 
David Miliband wrote, the CCM “is one of the most significant 
developments in the area of conventional arms control,” through 
which “[w]e will be banning an entire category of weapons.”8 
 
 4. Convention on Cluster Munitions, Oslo Process, http://www.cluster 
convention.org/pages/pages_vi/vib_osloprocess.html (last visited May 9, 2010) 
(naming the locations of the other three conferences as Lima, Peru (May 2007), 
Vienna, Austria (December 2007), and Wellington, New Zealand (February 2008), 
and noting that there were also a number of regional meetings leading up to the 
convention). 
 5. Id. At this meeting, the states committed to conclude an international 
instrument by 2008 that, inter alia, prohibits the production and use of CMs and 
establishes a framework for stockpile destruction. Declaration, Oslo Conf. on 
Cluster Munitions, ¶ 1, (Feb. 23, 2007), available at http://www.clusterconvent 
ion.org/downloadablefiles/Oslo%20DeclarationFeb07.pdf. 
 6. Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Adopting the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, http://www.clusterconvention.org/pages/pages_i/i_statesadop 
ting.html (last visited May 9, 2010). 
 7. Cf. Dept. of Foreign Aff., Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster 
Munitions, http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/ (last updated Nov. 21, 2008) 
(describing the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ view of the participation in and the 
reasoning for the convention).  For a detailed overview and a personnel account of 
this conference, see John Borrie, How the Cluster Munition Ban Was Won:  Oslo 
Treaty Negotiations Conclude in Dublin, DISARMAMENT DIPL., Summer 2008, 
available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd88/88jb.htm [hereinafter Borrie, 
How the Cluster Munition Ban Was Won], and The Road from Oslo: Emerging 
International Efforts on Cluster Munitions, DISARMAMENT DIPL., Summer 2007, 
available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd85/85olso.htm [hereinafter Borrie, 
The Road from Oslo]. For the most comprehensive and updated overview of the 
entire Oslo Process, see JOHN BORRIE, UNACCEPTABLE HARM: A HISTORY OF HOW 
THE TREAT TO BAN CLUSTER MUNITIONS WAS WON (United Nations 2009). 
 8. David Miliband & Frank Walter Steinmeier, Towards a Safer World, 
GUARDIAN, Dec. 2, 2008, available at  http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentis 
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Yet, in that same year, 2007, another multilateral process emerged 
over the issue of CMs; rather than ban CMs, the process’s final goal 
was to regulate CMs—with all that entailed.9 In the face of the 
international outcry on the absence of any legal restrictions on CMs 
whatsoever,10 many major CM stockpilers and users continue to 
assert that various restrictions could adequately address the need to 
dramatically minimize the likely post-conflict harm associated with 
such weapons.  
According to its proponents, regulation should be accomplished 
through a set of legally binding restrictions issued under the auspices 
of the 1980 U.N. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use 
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (“CCW”).11 
This convention constituted a framework for the separate protocols 
 
free/2008/dec/02/weaponstechnology-armstrade. 
 9. See Van Woudenburg, supra note 3, at 474 (detailing the proposal in the 
Conventional Weapons Convention (“CCW”) by Germany for Protocol VI 
regarding regulation of cluster munitions, which called for new standards, clear 
restrictions, and ultimately the “replacement of present-day cluster munitions by a 
new generation of area target munitions”). See generally MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, 
THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS BEFORE AND AFTER 
HIROSHIMA 33-34 (1981) (describing classification issues regarding the regulation 
of nuclear weapons as an analogy for the possible implications of the evolving 
cultural restraints on the use of CMs); BRIAN RAPPERT, CONTROLLING THE 
WEAPONS OF WAR: POLITICS, PERSUASION, AND THE PROHIBITION OF INHUMANITY 
123-36 (2006) (analyzing issues that prohibition on weapons may cause, 
particularly in the area of classification). 
 10. See, e.g., Hard Fought Landmine Victory Faces New Threat, BIRMINGHAM 
POST, Sept. 19, 2007, at 11 (describing the need for an international regulation of 
cluster munitions due to their popularity as weapons and their potential for deadly 
destruction). 
 11. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to 
Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 I.L.M. 1523 
[hereinafter CCW]. The treaty entered into full force Dec. 2, 1983, and as of May 
2010, there were 111 parties to the CCW, some of which have not ratified all the 
protocols, and five signatories.  See, e.g., Peter Kolarov, CCW Secretariat, U.N. 
Office for Disarmament Aff., The Convention on Prohibitions or Restriction on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), presented at U.N. Regional 
Seminar on Promoting the Universality of the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (CCW) and its Annexed Protocols in South Asia, Southeast Asia and 
South Pacific (UNRCPD) (Dec. 17-18, 2008) (detailing the number of states that 
have signed on to the various protocols of the CCW). 
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formulated regarding conventional weapons; as such, it is confined to 
general provisions (e.g., its entry into force or scope)). It currently 
comprises three initial protocols and two which were adopted later: 
(I) Non-Detectable Fragments (by X-rays),12 (II) Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices 
(amended in 1996),13 (III) Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Incendiary Weapons,14 (IV) Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons 
(adopted in 1995),15 and (V) Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War 
(“ERW”) (adopted in 2003).16  
A proposed draft text of Protocol VI on CMs (“Draft Protocol”) 
includes prohibitions and restrictions on storage, destruction, and 
transfer of CMs between countries but falls far short of the 
prohibitions contained in the CCM.17 While no consensus was 
reached on the Draft Protocol during the five CM sessions held by 
the expert subsidiary body of the CCW, the Group of Governmental 
Experts (“GGE”), the CCW States Parties, in their November 2008 
annual meeting, decided to continue work into 2009 while setting 
aside two 2009 GGE sessions to address the CM weapons issue.18 
 
 12. CCW, supra note 11, Protocol I. 
 13. See CCW, supra note 11, Protocol II (addressing the restriction of land 
mines, booby traps and other weapons); see also CCW Protocol on Blinding Laser 
Weapons (Protocol IV) art. 1, Oct. 13, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1218 [hereinafter CCW 
Protocol IV] (amending Protocol II of the CCW). 
 14. See CCW, supra note 11, Protocol III (introducing the protocol for use of 
incendiary devices and detailing the protection of civilians). 
 15. CCW Protocol IV, supra note 13. 
 16. Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, CCW/MSP/2003/3 (Nov. 28, 
2003) [hereinafter CCW Protocol V]. 
 17. Group of Governmetnal Experts of the Staets Parties to the Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 
[GGE-CCW], Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions,  CCW/MSP/2009/WP.1 (Oct. 
21, 2009) [hereinafter GGE-CCW, Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions]. For a 
critical review, article by article, of an earlier slightly modified version (July 
2008), see HUM. RTS. WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH OBSERVATIONS ON THE 
CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCW) DRAFT PROTOCOL ON 
CLUSTER MUNITIONS (2008), available at http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/ 
wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/observations-on-ccw-draft-prot-ii-082908.pdf 
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OBSERVATIONS]. 
 18. Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions 
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Report, ¶ 
34, CCW/MSP/2008/4 (Jan. 23, 2009); see also Jeff Abramson, CCW Fails to 
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Nonetheless, no agreed text was completed even in 2009 and in their 
November 2009 annual meeting, CCW State Parties decided to 
continue negotiation in 2010.19 
Irrespective of the identity of the conference’s participants, the 
state that served as a catalyst, albeit inadvertently, for bringing CMs 
to the forefront of the international arena most recently was Israel.20 
Despite earlier moves toward banning CMs and the increasing call of 
some CCW members to address the humanitarian problems 
associated with the weapon in recent years,21 no significant steps 
were expected to be taken at that time. However, the 2006 Second 
Lebanon War, in which Israel extensively used CMs,22 prompted 
states into action.  
Naturally, Israel’s use of CMs attracted much attention due to the 
harm done to South Lebanon’s civilians, as well as the required 
clearance and risk-awareness activities.23 In contrast, the far reaching 
 
Reach Cluster Munitions Pact, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 2008, at 48 
[hereinafter Abramson, CCW Fails to Reach Cluster Munitions Pact] (observing 
that no consensus was reached in large part due to disagreements between CCM 
supporters and CCW supporters). 
 19. After prolonged, futile discussions as to whether the State Parties were 
negotiating a protocol or merely a proposal for protocol, it was agreed that the 
GGE “will conclude its negotiations as rapidly as possible and report to the next 
Meeting of the High Contracting Parties,” while two sessions were scheduled for 
April 12-16, 2010 and August 30-September 3, 2010. See Meeting of the High 
Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Report, ¶ 40, CCW/MSP/2009/5 (Nov. 
20, 2009). As to the discussion itself, see Katherine Harrison, Landmine Action 
Notes on CCW (Nov. 14, 2009) (unpublished Note, on file with  author). 
 20. See, e.g., Isabel Kershner, Israel Won't Prosecute for Use of Cluster Bombs 
in Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2007, at A4 (reporting on Israel’s use of CMs in 
the 2006 war with Hezbollah garnered the attention of a high ranking United 
Nations official). 
 21. See Chris C. Sanders, Contending With Explosive Remnants of War, ARMS 
CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 1, 2004, at 16,  19 (summarizing the concerns of non-
governmental organizations with respect to CMs, including “not only  . . . 
unexploded ordnance, but also . . .  the direct impact on civilian populations of the 
cluster bombs that doe explode as they can lead to significant civilian casualties”). 
 22. See Wade Boese, Cluster Munitions Under New Scrutiny, ARMS CONTROL 
TODAY, Oct. 1, 2006, at 38 (noting that unexploded CMs continued to harm people 
even after the official end to the war). 
 23. See id. (detailing the impact of cluster munitions on civilians and the 
locations of explosive remnants of war, and citing estimates that it would take up 
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implications of Israel’s extensive use of the weapon, rooted mainly 
in the theoretical dilemma distinguishing an absolute ban on CMs (as 
advocated in the Oslo Process) from a “relative” ban (as formulated 
in the CCW process), were neglected.  
 This oversight was unfortunate given the 2008 release of two 
important documents: Israel’s Inquiry Commission into the Second 
Lebanon War (“Winograd Report”), which reviewed Israel’s use of 
CMs and their legality ,24 and Israel Defense Force’s (“IDF”) 
Military Advocate General’s (“MAG”) legal opinion on whether the 
IDF’s extensive use of CM complied with international humanitarian 
law (“IHL”).25  
This article is divided into two sections. Part I provides a brief 
historical record of past failed attempts to ban CMs. It also describes 
Israel’s extensive CM use, as well as the resulting international 
outcry and its impetus to the CCM’s formulation.26 Part II analyzes 
the Winograd Report and the MAG’s legal opinion, from which it 
gleans seven overlooked lessons regarding CMs’ legality, but mainly 
 
to fifteen months to clear the unexploded CMs). 
 24. See COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE LEBANON CAMPAIGN IN 2006, THE 
SECOND LEBANON WAR, FINAL REPORT (2008) [hereinafter WINOGRAD REPORT], 
available at http://www.vaadatwino.org.il/reports.html#null. The unclassified 
version of the Report was released in January 2008 and is known as the Winograd 
Commission after its chairman, Justice (Ret.) Dr. Eliyahu Winograd. Other 
members of the Commission include Law Professor Ruth Gavison, Political 
Science Professor Yehezkel Dror, and IDF Generals (Reserves) Menachem Einan 
and Chaim Nadel. It should be noted that in April 2007 the Commission issued a 
lengthy Interim Report which focuses on other issues. COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE 
LEBANON CAMPAIGN IN 2006, THE SECOND LEBANON WAR, INTERIM REPORT 
(2007), available at http://www.vaadatwino.org.il/reports.html#null [hereinafter 
INTERIM REPORT]. 
 25. See MAG, Brig. Gen. Avihai Mendelblit, Main Points of MAG's Legal 
Opinion for Inquiring Officer over the Circumstance of Employing Cluster 
Munitions during the Second Lebanon War, June 18, 2008 (on file with author) 
[hereinafter MAG’s Legal Opinion]. The opinion was written in September 2007 
and partially declassified in June 2008.  Although it was released on September 6, 
2007, the public learned of this important instrument only in December 2007. At 
the time, the MAG refused to release even an unclassified version despite repeated 
requests by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (“ACRI”). Only on June 18, 
2008, six months after the ACRI's first appeal on January 9, 2008, was a segment 
of the document—thirteen out of thirty pages in the classified version—released. 
Telephone Interview with Adv. Dan Yakir, Chief Legal Counsel, Association for 
Civil Rights in Israel (July 13, 2008). 
 26. See infra Part I. 
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the CCM’s necessity vis-à-vis the likely effectiveness of the CMs 
Draft Protocol under the CCW.27  
As these lessons suggest, none of the restrictions as proposed in 
the Draft Protocol could ensure that a humanitarian crisis such as that 
observed in South Lebanon would not recur. On the contrary, as this 
article suggests, future use of CMs in armed conflicts under the Draft 
Protocol or any other would-be legal instrument regulating their use 
may in fact accelerate and/or encourage use. Therefore, when 
considering the theoretical dilemma pitting the banning model 
against the regulation model, Israel’s experience seems to support the 
first option. As the 2006 War strongly suggests, when it comes to 
restraining the use of the CM weapon in a bitter conflict, no state is 
to be trusted.  
I. SETTING: THE SECOND LEBANON WAR AND 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE CCM 
A. PAST ATTEMPTS TO BAN CMS  
Contrary to common assumptions, CMs predate not only the 
Vietnam War, but also WWII.28 Various types of air-dropped CMs, 
as defined in the CCM,29 were already in use in WWI.30 
 
 27. See infra Part II. 
 28. See Woudenberg, supra note 3, at 447 (noting that the first CMs were first 
used by Germany in WWII); see also Alexander Breitegger, Preventing Human 
Suffering During and After Conflict? The Complementary Case for a Specific 
Convention on Cluster Munitions, in 10 AUSTRIAN REV. OF INT’L & EUR. L. 3, 7-8 
(Gerhard Loibl & Stephan Wittich eds., 2005) (suggesting that past “military 
excesses” served as catalysts for advancing international law on CMs). 
 29. CCM, supra note 2, art. 2(2).  But see Van Woudenberg, supra note 3, at 
454 (highlighting that there is no uniform definition of cluster munition).  For an 
analysis of the implications of the definition of CMs within the Oslo Negotiations, 
see Brian Rappert & Richard Moyes, The Prohibition of Cluster Munitions: Setting 
International Precedents for Defining Inhumanity, 16 NONPROLIFERATION REV. 
237, 246-47 (2009). 
 30. See WOLFGANG FLEISCHER, GERMAN AIR-DROPPED WEAPONS TO 1945, at 
15, 141 (Ted Oliver trans., 2004) (documenting the specifications of the 
Splitterbombe SD-2, which was used by the German Air Force as an anti-
personnel device and contained either thirty-two or forty-two bombs).  See 
generally Thomas J. Herthel, On the Chopping Block: Cluster Munitions and the 
Law of War, 51 A.F. L. REV. 229, 234-39 (2001) (providing a succinct overview of 
the history of cluster munitions). 
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Nevertheless, as noted by Professor Kalshoven, the Vietnam War, 
“more than anything else prompted [the international community’s] 
renewed interest in an almost forgotten topic,” namely the question 
of banning use of specific weapons.31 U.S. use of CMs, which were 
crowned as “[t]he most indiscriminate and lethal area weapon[s] 
developed for the Vietnam War,” provoked considerable public 
opposition.32 In fact, when South Vietnam used CMs (CBU-55) 
against North Vietnam’s invading army, the latter issued a stern 
warning and threatened that the army pilots deploying these weapons 
would be charged with war crimes.33 
When the international community began debating application of 
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of various conventional 
weapons in the 1970s, antipersonnel fragmentation CMs were among 
the few weapons to become the target of proposals for categorical 
prohibitions under what was to become the CCW.34 However, major 
 
 31. FRITS KALSHOVEN, ARMS, ARMAMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 225 
(1985). 
 32. Michael Krepon, Blanket Coverage: Two Case Studies of Area Weapons in 
Indochina, in THE WORLD MILITARY ORDER: THE IMPACT OF MILITARY 
TECHNOLOGY ON THE THIRD WORLD 49, 56 (Mary Kaldor & Asbjørn Eide eds., 
1979). See generally ERIC PROKOSCH, THE TECHNOLOGY OF KILLING: A MILITARY 
AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF ANTIPERSONNEL WEAPONS, 83-105 (1995) (providing 
a historical account of the use of various types of cluster bombs in Vietnam and 
subsequent investigations).  The concern aroused by the weapons’ use is evidenced 
by the amount of testimony regarding them in the 1967 proceedings before the 
International War Crimes Tribunal. Technical Aspects of Fragmentation Bombs 
Testimony by Jean Pierre Vidier, M.D., in AGAINST THE CRIME OF SILENCE: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL 249, 249-58 (John 
Duffett ed., 1968). 
 33. Antonio Cassese, Reprisals as a Means of Enforcing the Laws of Warfare 
(1977), in THE NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 170 (Antonio 
Cassese ed., 1980).  The warning was issued in April 1975. The North Vietnamese 
claims were based on the “inhumane” and “indiscriminate” nature of the weapons, 
which they declared as “contrary to international law” and responsible for 
terrorizing the civilian population. Id. at 161, 172 & n.39. 
 34. See Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (1974), U.N. Doc. 
CDDH/DT/2 (Feb. 21, 1974) (listing the weapons which were the subject of 
proposals for outright bans). The proposals, which were supported by Egypt, 
Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and Sudan, also included bans 
against incendiary weapons, multiple flechette weapons, and especially injurious 
small-caliber projectiles.  A slightly amended draft, ultimately supported by 
sixteen states, was submitted in 1975.  Diplomatic Conference on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
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military powers, particularly the United States and its allies, opposed 
any proposal to restrict, let alone ban, the use of CMs.35 The need for 
consensus with respect to adding a new protocol forestalled 
acceptance of any meaningful weapons prohibitions and ensured that 
no restrictions on CMs would apply.36  
The concern provoked by subsequent large-scale use of CMs in 
armed conflicts that attracted international attention, such as the 1999 
NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia,37 was unable to fundamentally change the situation but it 
was enough to lead to the 2003 adoption of Protocol V to the CCW 
on ERW. Following the high rate of civilian casualties in Kosovo—
mainly from CM duds—the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (“ICRC”) “called for a moratorium” on CM use “pending the 
adoption of rules on ERW,” a call which initiated eight years of 
discussions.38  
 
Armed Conflicts, Vol. XVI, Geneva, Switz., 1974-1977, Incendiary Weapons, 
U.N. Doc. CDDH/IV/201. 
 35. See Hum. Rts. Watch, Move by U.S., Others to Support Cluster Munitions 
Fails, U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 15, 2006, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/ 
2008/11/14/move-us-others-support-cluster-munitions-fails (reporting that the 
United States and other countries in fact pushed a protocol that “would allow the 
use of all existing cluster munitions, including the oldest, most inaccurate, and 
unreliable varieties, for a period of up to 20 years”). 
 36. See id. (indicating that the CCW operates only by consensus and that about 
twenty-five countries opposed the draft text). 
 37. See, e.g., Hundreds March Against Airstrikes, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 29, 1999, at 
3B (describing protests against the NATO bombings); Final Report to the 
Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing 
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 I.L.M. 1257, 1264-65 
(2000) (showing that concern over the bombings was significant enough to require 
an investigation into pursuing possible prosecution).  For criticism on the decision 
to refrain from investigating possible war crimes (including the attack with CMs 
on Niš, the third-largest city in Serbia) see Anne-Sophie Massa, The Decision of 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
Not To Investigate: An Abusive Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion?, 24 
BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 610, 633 (2006). 
 38. See Louis Maresca, A New Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War: The 
History and Negotiation of Protocol V to the 1980 Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons, 86 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 815, 817-18 (2004) (relating the 
details of an ICRC study, which found that more civilians died from CMs than 
from landmines); see also Van Woudenberg, supra note 3, 468-76 (tracking the 
progress of ICRC and CCW discussions on CM regulation). 
BARAK_AUTHOR CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2010  9:31 AM 
2010] NONE TO BE TRUSTED 433 
However, the Protocol on ERW, in force since November 2006, 
fails to directly address the dangers of CMs; instead, it focuses on 
post-conflict requirements, and its provisions suffer from an over-
abundance of ambiguities and weak, qualifying language to the point 
where few, if any, obligations are binding.39 Furthermore, even 
during the negotiations, various states as well as international and 
non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) did not regard as 
adequate a protocol dealing only with post-conflict situations.40 As 
such, the ERW problem remains on the agenda with the GGE 
working according to its original mandate (2003), which mentions 
CMs only indirectly.41  
Therefore, when the CCW Third Review Conference convened in 
November 2006, CMs were not on the agenda and it was doubted 
whether they would attract much attention.42 But in the aftermath of 
the Second Lebanon War, the CM issue—with strong 
“encouragement from the ICRC”43 as well as the Cluster Munition 
 
 39. See Peter Herby & Anna Nuiten, Explosive Remnants of War: Protecting 
Civilians through an Additional Protocol to the 1980 Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons, 83 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 195 (2001) (analyzing Protocol 
V, which delineates the responsibilities of states to clean up unexploded or 
abandoned munitions after the end of hostilities). 
 40. See Van Woudenberg, supra note 3, 477 (indicating that the Oslo Initiative 
was created as a call to stricter regulation of cluster munitions than that which was 
provided by the CCW’s protocol). 
 41. See Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed 
to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Nov. 18-19, 2004, 
Report of the Meeting of the States Parties, at 4, CCW/MSP/2004/2 (Dec. 13, 
2004) (stating that the work of the GGE on ERW would continue into 2005); see 
also Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Nov. 24-25, 2006, Report 
of the Meeting of the States Parties, at 5, CCW/MSP/2005/2 (Feb. 14, 2006) 
(stipulating that the work of the GGE on ERW would continue into 2006). 
 42. See Borrie, The Road from Oslo, supra note 7, at 46 (describing the lack of 
attention cluster munition regulation received in the CCW after 2003). 
 43. Id. at 47 (describing cluster munition regulations being the focus after the 
Lebanon War).  The ICRC was shocked by Israel's extensive use of CMs, and the 
ICRC's Director for International Law and Cooperation, Philip Spoerri, later stated 
"[the] density of cluster submunition contamination may be unprecedented."   U.N. 
INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RES., THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF CLUSTER 
MUNITIONS 30 (2008) [hereinafter UNIDIR REPORT]. 
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Coalition (“CMC”)44—secured a high place on the agenda. The 
issue’s importance was well reflected in the then U.N. Secretary 
General (“UNSG”) Kofi Annan’s call for a “freeze” on CM use in 
populated areas, together with the destruction of inaccurate and 
unreliable CMs.45 Led by Norway, twenty-five states called to ban 
CMs “that pose serious humanitarian hazards because they are for 
example unreliable and/or inaccurate.”46 As expected, this 
declaration did not achieve a consensus. Ultimately, experts 
convened in June 2007 to further consider the application and 
implementation of existing IHL “to specific munitions that may 
cause explosive remnants of war, with particular focus on cluster 
munitions.”47 
In a June 2007 meeting, Germany submitted a draft Protocol VI on 
CMs.48 Concurrently, the United States, contrary to its traditional 
policy, declared its willingness to begin negotiations on a Protocol to 
restrict CM use “but not a ban on the weapons.”49 As observers 
 
 44. See Cluster Munition Coal., The Problem, 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/the-problem/ (last visited May 12, 2010).  
The CMC—a group of around three hundred NGOs from more than eighty 
countries—was formed after the 2003 Dublin Conference on ERW. It is active in 
campaigning for a ban on CMs similar to the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (“ICBL”). See id. (providing background information on the CMC). 
 45. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Director-General, U.N. Office at Geneva, The 
Secretary General’s Message to Third Review Conference of the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons, Nov. 7, 2006, available at 
http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2289. 
 46. Third Rev. Conf. of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 
Nov. 7-17, 2006, Documents of the Third Review Conference, at 41, 
CCW/CONF.III/11 (Part III). 
 47. Third Rev. Conf. of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 
Nov. 7-17, 2006, Final Declaration, at 6, CCW/CONF.III/11 (Part II). 
 48. GGE-CCW, June 19-22, 2007, Draft CCW Protocol on Cluster Munitions, 
annex, CCW/GGE/2007/WP.1 (May 1, 2007) (submitted by Germany); see also 
GGE-CCW, June 19-22, 2007, Draft CCW Negotiating Mandate on Cluster 
Munitions, at ¶ 1, CCW/GGE/2007/WP.3 (June 1, 2007) (submitted by Germany 
on Behalf of the European Union) (introducing a draft mandate to begin 
negotiations on Protocol VI). 
 49. See John Zarocostas, U.S. Eyes Limits on 'Cluster' Weapons; but Refuses 
Ban on the Bombs, WASH. TIMES, June 19, 2007, at A11 (noting that the United 
States had changed its position after an “internal review” and after considering the 
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speculated, the U.S. change was “intended to prevent mass 
defections to an ‘Oslo Treaty.’”50 At the 2007 CCW States Parties’ 
annual meeting, a consensus was achieved to “negotiate a proposal to 
address urgently the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, while 
striking a balance between military and humanitarian 
considerations.”51 In truth, some major CM users and stockpilers, 
especially Russia, do not support the proposed Protocol.52 Other 
countries, such as China, India, Israel, and Pakistan, all of which 
shunned the Oslo Process, shared views similar to Russia’s. 
However, given the importance that the United States attached to the 
Protocol, those same states are paying lip service to the Oslo 
Process.53  
Yet, despite five sessions of the GGE held throughout 2008, 
during which major CM stockpilers, but mainly the United States, 
worked to gain wide support for drafting a sixth protocol on CMs, 
states were unable to agree upon the text.54 In its subsequent 
 
humanitarian concerns associated with using cluster munitions). 
 50. See Borrie, The Road from Oslo, supra note 7, 51-52. As Borrie suggested 
in another piece, the United States was aware that "it would be politically difficult 
for supporters of the Oslo Process to appear to reject a CCW negotiating mandate 
on cluster munitions."  Borrie, How the Cluster Munition Ban Was Won, supra 
note 7. 
 51. Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions 
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be 
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Nov. 7-13, 
2007, Report, at 9, CCW/MSP/2007/5 (Dec. 3, 2007). 
 52. See Miles A. Pomper, Cluster Munitions Talks Gain Steam, ARMS 
CONTROL TODAY, Mar. 2008, at 52 (noting that Russia is reluctant to support the 
Protocol because it is “too expensive and technologically demanding”). 
 53. See Borrie, How the Cluster Munition Ban Was Won, supra note 7, at 51-52 
(listing “core” Oslo Process supporters as Austria, the Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Norway, and Peru); E-mail from John Borrie, Senior Research & 
Project Manager at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, to 
Eitan Barak, Professor of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Dec. 15, 
2008, 21:39 CET) (on file with author); cf. Dr. Rodica Radian Gordon, Dir. of 
Arms Control Dep’t, Israel Ministry of For. Aff., Explanation of the Vote at 
Convention on Cluster Munitions (L.56), available at 
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com08/EOV/IsraelL56.pdf  
(explaining Israel’s view that the CCW is the best and most promising place to 
deal with cluster munition regulation). 
 54. Cf. Stephen Mathias, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Meeting of States 
Parties to Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), U.S. Delegation 
Statement on the Work of the GGE (Nov. 13, 2008), available at 
http://geneva.usmission.gov/2008/11/13/gge/ (expressing the disappointment of the 
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November 2008 annual meeting, the CCW States Parties agreed to 
continue their negotiations on “proposals,”55 while setting aside two 
2009 GGE sessions to address CM weapons. 56 
As of mid 2007, as many as thirty-two states were known to have 
produced more than two hundred different types of CM; furthermore, 
some seventy-five armies worldwide include this weapon in their 
arsenals.57 Therefore, as the chairman of the GGE on CMs 
commented: “I hope that everybody will keep in mind that 90 
percent of world stockpiles are not covered by the CCM.”58  
Indeed, as statements from countries attending the Dublin 
conference and/or the Oslo signing conference show, some states 
have already begun to remove CMs from service.59 Yet, the 
challenge the CCM faces vis-à-vis achievement of universal 
 
U.S. delegation regarding the lack of consensus on the new protocol). 
 55. See Abramson, CCW Fails to Reach Cluster Munitions Pact, supra note 18, 
at 48 (“Russia objected to using the word ‘protocol’ if . . . work were to 
continue.”). 
 56. See Posting of John Borrie to Disarmament Insight, CCW: The Wailing 
Wall (Nov. 7, 2008, 15:15 EST),  
http://disarmamentinsight.blogspot.com/2008/11/ccw-wailing-wall.html (reporting 
that 25 CCW State Parties, mainly strong supporters of the Oslo Process, issued a 
joint statement  concerning opposition to the protocol). But see Stephen Mathias, 
U.S. Delegation Statement on Proposed Changes by Group of 25, Nov. 7, 2008, 
available at  http://www.us-mission.ch/ccw/statements/1107Group25.html 
(reiterating U.S. opposition to a complete ban on CMs); see also Meeting of the 
High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Report, ¶ 34, CCW/MSP/2008/4 (Jan. 
23, 2009) (reporting the final decision). 
 57. See Women’s Int’l League for Peace and Freedom, 32 Countries that 
Produce Cluster Munitions, http://www.wilpf.int.ch/disarmament/clustermuniti 
ons/producers.html (last updated Nov. 2007) (listing countries that have produced 
cluster munitions); see also Hum. Rts. Watch, A Dirty Dozen Cluster Munitions, 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/clusters/chart/ (last visited May 13, 2010) 
(listing stockpiling countries). 
 58. Jeff Abramson, CCW Considers Limits on Cluster Munitions, ARMS 
CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 2008, at 43 [hereinafter Abramson, CCW Considers Limits 
on Cluster Munitions]. (failing to give any evidential basis for the high figure). 
 59. See, e.g., Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Fed. Minister for For. Aff., Speech at 
the Signing Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Oslo (Mar. 12, 
2008) (stating that Germany had decided to destroy its cluster munitions prior to 
the conference); Maxime Verhagen, Minister of For. Aff., Speech at Signing 
Conference, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Oslo (Dec. 3, 2008) (indicating that 
the Netherlands had already begun destruction of its cluster munitions). 
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adherence is far more challenging than the one faced by its 
predecessor, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel (“AP”) 
Mines and on their Destruction (“Ottawa Convention”).60 Unlike AP 
mines, CMs are perceived by modern militaries as an effective and 
indispensable weapon.61 Indeed, as stated U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates when announcing a new U.S. policy on CMs in June 
2008, “[c]luster munitions are legitimate weapons with clear military 
utility. They are effective weapons, provide distinct advantages 
against a range of targets . . . and are an integral part of U.S. forces 
capabilities.”62  
B. ISRAEL’S EXTENSIVE USE OF CMS 
Given the 2006 Second Lebanon War’s limited geographical 
boundaries and short duration (34 days), Israel fired an 
unprecedented quantity of CMs.63 In addition to the small-scale use 
of indigenous M85 bomblets,64 there was extensive use of U.S.-made 
 
 60. United Nations: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sep. 
18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211, 36 I.L.M. 1507. 
 61. Cf. Robert G. Gard, Jr., The Military Utility of Anti-Personnel Mines, in TO 
WALK WITHOUT FEAR: THE GLOBAL MOVEMENT TO BAN LANDMINES 136, 138-54  
(Maxwell A. Cameron et al. eds., 1999) (providing information on the limited 
military utility attributed to AP mines and their banning, but acknowledging that 
many states have an interest in continuing to use them). 
 62. Memorandum from the Sec’y of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military 
Depts. et al. (June 19, 2008). In principle, the new policy sets the goal of using 
CMs with less than one percent HDR within the next ten years. See id. (indicating 
the time frame and policy for the Department of Defense concerning HDR). 
 63. See generally HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON: ISRAEL’S 
USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS IN LEBANON IN JULY AND AUGUST 2006 (2008) 
[hereinafter HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON] (analyzing the use of 
cluster munitions by Israel and the impact they had on Lebanon and its people). 
 64. See id. at 32 (describing the types of cluster munitions used by Israel in the 
Lebanon War). Each M395 and M396 155mm artillery shell contains and delivers 
sixty-three and forty-nine M85 bomblets, respectively. Id. at 30. Additionally, 
some 130 Israeli-made Trajectory Correction System (“TCS”) rockets were first 
operational in this war. Id. at 32; see also Press Release, Israel Mil. Industries, 
IMI’s Trajectory Corrected Rocket Operated and Combat Proven in the 2nd 
Lebanon War (May 15, 2007) (describing the TCS rocket’s capabilities and the use 
by Israel during the war). The TCS rockets have a content of 644 M77 bomblets. 
Data presented to the author at the IMI exhibit marking Israel’s 60th anniversary, 
Rishon LeZion, Sept. 16-23, 2008; see also Amnon Barzilai, A Precise Rocket for 
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CMs, delivered by U.S.-made 155mm artillery shells, Multiple 
Launch Rocket System’s (“MLRS”) M26 rockets, and—albeit on a 
limited scale—Vietnam-era aerially delivered CBU-58B bombs.65 As 
more than 1,800 rockets were fired on Lebanon—each rocket 
containing 644 bomblets—more than 1.2 million cluster bombs were 
dispersed from this weapon system alone.66 According to official 
reports, the MLRS bomblets’ high dynamic range’s (“HDR”) ranges 
from 5% – 23%, implying that between 58,000 to 253,000 MLRS 
bomblets failed in Southern Lebanon.67 Given the official failure rate 
of 3% – 14%, artillery-delivered CMs and a careful estimate of the 
number of U.S.-made shells used, the conclusion to be reached is that 
some additional 21,000 failed bomblets are expected to be found 
somewhere in Lebanon.68 
 
40 km- for the IDF Use, HAARETZ, Aug. 17, 2004, at 6. Haaretz has published a 
concise English-language edition (also available online) as of September 1997. 
Citations were taken from this source whenever possible to avoid translation 
errors. Unless otherwise indicated, Hebrew sources were translated by the author. 
 65. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 28-
32 (describing the types of cluster munitions used by Israel that were partially 
made by the United States). No exact data are available for the number of air-
dropped CMs (CBU-58B with 650 bomblets each) used, but as of mid-January 
2008, 28,136 duds BLU-63 bomblets from the 2006 War were found; these 
constitute 20% of the total number of duds destroyed by the deminers. Id. at 32. 
 66. Meron Rapoport, When Rockets and Phosphorous Cluster, HAARETZ, Sep. 
13, 2006, available at  http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/761910.html; see 
also AMIR RAPAPORT, FRIENDLY FIRE 344 (2007). 
 67. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, CLUSTER MUNITIONS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: 
THE M26 ROCKET (2006), 
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/08/18/global14050.htm (providing a 
general overview of M26 rocket use in Lebanon). However, while the Human 
Rights Watch report cites official reports according to which the HDR is as high as 
16%, some U.S. official reports note significantly higher HDRS. See, e.g., U.S. 
GEN. ACCT. OFF. [GAO], OPERATION DESERT STORM: CASUALTIES CAUSED BY 
IMPROPER HANDLING OF UNEXPLODED U.S. SUBMUNITIONS 4 (1993) (relaying  an 
HDR rate as high as 23%). 
 68. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 29 
& n.66 (aggregating data on failure rates from the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense, the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center, and the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics). Although no 
official data are available, relying on artillerists' eyewitness accounts, it is clear 
that no more than five percent of the used shells delivered CMs (i.e., some 8,500 
shells) from which a small part (assuming some 2,500 shells) were Israeli-made 
shells having a lower number of bomblets (each U.S.-made artillery shell contains 
88 bomblets). As such, up to 685,500 bomblets were delivered by artillery shells. 
See Hanan Greenberg, IDF: Use of Cluster Bombs During War Legal, 
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In sum, even given the HDR’s lowest estimates of all CMs in use, 
the IDF commanders who executed the firing of these munitions 
knew in advance that a total of 79,000 duds would remain on 
Lebanese soil.69 However, low official HDRs, as acknowledged by 
the Winograd Commission,70 were proven to be unreliable. 
Therefore, the actual number of duds in South Lebanon is much 
higher and reflected in the high number of duds found so far as 
compared to the maximum number of 79,000 duds expected 
according to the official HDRs.71 This number is, of course, far from 
the million duds (among four million used bomblets) estimated by 
the United Nations.72 As the U.S. State Department rightly pointed 
 
YNETNEWS.COM, Dec. 24, 2007, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
3486267,00.html. 
 69. The number of duds to be expected from the aerially delivered CM BLU-63 
bomblets, which have a declared HDR of five percent, is excluded from our 
calculation.  Nonetheless, the fact that the some 2,500 Israeli–made shells have 
fewer bomblets offsets this exclusion. 
 70. See infra, Part II, Lesson 1. 
 71. Cf. GENEVA INT’L CTR. FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING, GUIDE TO 
CLUSTER MUNITIONS 20 (2d ed. 2009) (indicating that as of December 2008, a 
total number of 153,755 duds had been found in Lebanon). However, the actual 
figure is higher, as no figures contain accurate estimates of the large numbers of 
unexploded sub-munitions cleared by local villagers or during undocumented 
emergency clearance by the Lebanese Armed Forces (“LAF”) and the U.N. Interim 
Force in Lebanon (“UNIFIL”), conducted after large numbers of sub-munitions 
were found on in populated areas. Cf. HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH 
LEBANON, supra note 63, at 82-90 (describing the cleanup efforts of failed 
submunitions in Lebanon). 
 72. See, e.g., Michael Slackman, Israeli Bomblets Plague Lebanon, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at A1 (“[S]outhern Lebanon is littered with one million 
unexploded bomblets, far outnumbering the 650,000 people living in the region.”). 
The estimate was provided by MAAC-SL, which had relied on a press report 
stating that 160,000 shells were fired and that an estimated 10%–20% of these (i.e., 
16,000 to 32,000 shells) delivered U.S.-made CMs. Hence, a total of 
approximately 1.4 to 2.8 million bomblets were fired by Israel. See U.N. MINE 
ACTION COORDINATION CTR., SOUTH LEBANON CLUSTER BOMB INFORMATION 
SHEET 2, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/retrieveattachments? 
openagent&shortid=EKOI-74B5B5&file=Full_Report.pdf (providing data on the 
amount of unexploded cluster munitions).  To those figures, the U.N. Mine Action 
Coordination Center South Lebanon (“MACC-SL”) added the 1,159,200 MLRS 
bomblets. Id.; see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 
63, at 37 (providing a reproduction of this calculation by NGOs dated as late as 
January 2008). 
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out, given the rate of clearance, the actual number of duds found 
does not support such a high estimate.73  
C. THE INTERNATIONAL OUTCRY AND THE CCM’S 
EMERGENCE 
Although few accusations appeared in the international media 
claiming Israel’s use of CMs was illegal74 amidst the intense fighting, 
the world’s outcry was raised in the war’s aftermath; Israel suddenly 
found itself under heavy attack.75 Israel was publicly condemned 
even by then UNSG Annan, while then Humanitarian Affairs and 
Emergency Relief Coordinator, Under-Secretary-General Jan 
Egeland, Annan’s aide, chose to focus his criticism on the fact that 
“90 percent of the cluster bomb strikes occurred in the last 72 hours 
of the conflict, when we knew there would be a resolution.”76 Israel’s 
 
 73. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Pol.-Mil. Aff., White Paper: Putting the 
Impact of Cluster Munitions in Context with the Effects of All Explosive 
Remnants of War, Fact Sheet (Feb. 15, 2008), available at  
http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=36f73dda-59a2-4755-9f50-
a2e006592343 [hereinafter U.S. White Paper] (providing results of U.S. efforts to 
destroy conventional munitions in other countries).  However, it was stressed that 
this should not be construed as stating that the duds did not “create[] a significant 
humanitarian impact in southern Lebanon." Id. 
 74. But see Press Release, Human Rts. Watch, Israeli Cluster Munitions Hit 
Civilians in Lebanon: Israel Must Not Use Indiscriminate Weapons (July 24, 
2006), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/24/isrlpa13798_txt.htm (opining that 
cluster munitions violate international humanitarian law); Robert Pear, Rally Near 
White House Protests Violence in Mideast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006, at A22 
(detailing protests in the United States in reaction to Israel’s bombing of Lebanon). 
 75. See Marvin Kalb & Carol Saivetz, The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006: The 
Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict, 12 HARV. INT’L J. PRESS/POL., 
Summer 2007, at 43, 50-51 (describing views of both the news media and the 
public as highly critical of Israel’s bombing of Lebanon). This was part of a 
general trend among leading U.S. newspaper pages, the front pages of which 
“Israel was portrayed as the aggressor.” Id. at 51 (comparing the view of common 
newspapers towards Israel with their view of Hezbollah). 
 76. See THOMAS NASH, FORESEEABLE HARM: THE USE AND IMPACT OF 
CLUSTER MUNITIONS IN LEBANON 3 (2006) (quoting Egeland as describing Israel’s 
use of CMs as “shocking and “completely immoral”). This information led many 
Lebanese to believe that Israel's intention was "to litter the south with unexploded 
cluster bombs as a strategy to keep people from returning right away." Slackman, 
supra note 72; see also, e.g., Yoav Stern, Annan Condemns IDF Use of Cluster 
Bombs, HAARETZ, Sept. 1, 2006, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/ 
pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=757515&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbSubCon
trassID=0 (last visited Oct. 10, 2009) (criticizing IDF policy); Todd Pitman, 
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actions likewise drew heavy criticism in the four U.N. Human Rights 
Council (“UNHRC”) Rapporteurs’ report following their fact-finding 
mission to Lebanon and Israel in September 2006.77 The report led 
the Human Rights Council to establish a special U.N. Commission of 
Inquiry (“COI”) to investigate violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law by Israel, which produced the Report of November 
2006, which in turn reinforced and intensified that criticism.78 Most 
importantly, as both reports concluded, the international community 
should take “urgent action to add cluster munitions to the list of 
weapons banned under international law.”79 
Naturally, the harm to South Lebanon’s civilians as well as the 
required clearance and risk awareness activities attracted much 
attention by NGOs such as Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) and 
Landmine Action.80 Their reports, which were issued mainly by the 
 
Unexploded Israeli bombs Menace Lebanese, FOX NEWS, Aug. 31, 2006, 
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2006Aug31/0,4675,MideastClust
erBombsLH1,00.html (describing the outcry of officials over the use of the bombs 
by Israel but indicating they were not used illegally); cf. Michael L. Gross, The 
Second Lebanon War: The Question of Proportionality and the Prospect of Non-
Lethal Warfare, 7 J. MIL. ETHICS 1 (2008) (analyzing the effect that Israel’s strike 
at the end of the war had on the proportionality question). 
 77. See Mission to Lebanon and Israel, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Paul Hunt, the Representative of the 
Secretary-General on Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Walter 
Kälin, and the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the 
Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, Miloon Kothari, delivered to the U.N. 
Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/7 (Oct. 2, 2006) [hereinafter UNHRC 
Report].  After criticizing Israel's extensive use of CMs and raising doubts over 
their military necessity, the U.N. Rapporteurs noted that "[i]f proven, the widely 
reported claim . . . would indicate an intention to inhibit and prevent the return of 
civilians and a reckless disregard for the predictable civilian casualties that have 
occurred.” Id. at 10, 13, 25. 
 78. See id. at 58-60 (criticizing Israel’s extensive and unnecessary use of the 
cluster munition). 
 79. UNHRC REPORT, supra note 77, at 24-25. 
 80. See, e.g., NASH, supra note 76, at 34 (documenting the involvement of the 
MACC-SL and the Mine Advisory Group); HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH 
LEBANON, supra note 63; GREG CROWTHER, COUNTING THE COST: THE ECONOMIC 
IMPACT OF CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION IN LEBANON (2008) (providing 
Landmine Action’s report on the economic consequences of the cluster munition 
use by Israel); see also UNIDIR REPORT, supra note 43; CATHY SULTAN, 
TRAGEDY IN SOUTH LEBANON: THE ISRAELI-HEZBOLLAH WAR OF 2006 59-72 
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NGOs participating in the CMC as of 2006, have helped sustain the 
problematic implications in the public mind associated with CM use 
in the 2006 War.81  
Therefore, in spite of earlier developments toward banning CMs, 
including domestic measures such as the February 2006 Belgium 
National Legislation prohibiting CM manufacture, trade, and 
deployment,82—the first of its kind internationally—for many experts 
and CMC activists, Israel’s use ensured that the campaign to ban 
CMs would receive universal support.83 Even those experts and CMC 
activists who refused to perceive this use sine qua non for the CCM’s 
emergence admit it was crucial for creating the strong convention, 
signed by many countries.84 As Jonas Gahr Støre, Norway’s Foreign 
Minister clearly stated in October 2006, “[t]he case of Lebanon 
clearly demonstrates that there is a real need to strengthen 
humanitarian law in this area . . . . This is why Norway will take the 
lead . . . to put in place an international prohibition against cluster 
munitions.”85 Indeed, a month later, when the 2006 CCW Third 
 
(2008) (criticizing Israel’s use of cluster munitions in Lebanon). 
 81. Cf. HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 117 
(characterizing cluster munitions as illegal and stating that, in light of the conflict 
with Lebanon, states should immediately ban their use).  As expected, although 
covering various and different aspects, a rather common trait of them was a harsh 
criticism on Israel as well as a call for banning CMs or severely restricting their 
use. For example, as HRW concluded in its February 2008 report, "[t]hese factors 
lead us to conclude [sic] Israel’s attacks were indiscriminate and disproportionate, 
and thus illegal under international humanitarian law.” Id. 
 82. 176 Belgian Bulletin of Acts and Decrees, no. 184, June 9, 2006 (3d ed.). 
According to Richard Moyes, one of the three Co-Chairs of the CMC, the 
legislation played a key role in the Oslo Process's emergence by changing the 
dynamics. E-mail from Richard Moyes, Policy & Research Director at Action on 
Armed Violence, to Eitan Barak (Dec. 12, 2008) (on file with author). 
 83. Cf. Walter Gibbs & Kirk Semple, Afghanistan Agrees to Sign Bomb Treaty, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2008, at A17 (describing Israel’s positive effect on convincing 
states to sign the cluster munitions treaty, focusing specifically on Afghanistan). 
As the 1997 Nobel peace Laureate Jody Williams said during the Oslo Signing 
Ceremony: “Quite frankly, if Israel hadn’t done that, we might not have a cluster 
treaty today.” Id. 
 84. As prominent CMC activists (e.g., two of its co-chairs, Moyes and HRW's 
Arms Division Director Steve Goose summed it up, Lebanon was "necessary, but 
not sufficient," emphasizing that multilateral processes were already underway. 
See E-mail from Richard Moyes, supra note 82; E-mail from John Borrie, supra 
note 53. 
 85. Gibbs & Semple, supra note 83; see also J. Gahr Store, Cluster Munitions, 
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Review Conference convened, Norway attempted to ban CMs under 
this framework. Once realizing, however, that its attempts are 
doomed to failure, much to the U.S.’s displeasure,86 Støre announced 
Norway’s intention to organize a conference for like-minded 
governments seeking to ban CMs.87 From this point, the road to the 
Signing Conference was unavoidable. 
II: THE WINOGRAD REPORT, THE IDF MAG’S 
LEGAL OPINION AND THE CASE FOR THE CCM 
On September 26, 2006, nine days after the Winograd 
Commission was appointed by the Israeli Government in response to 
massive domestic pressures “[t]o look into the preparation and 
conduct of the political and the security levels concerning all the 
dimensions of the Northern Campaign which started on July 12, 
2006,”88 the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (“ACRI”) 
requested assurance that “the committee’s mandate include an 
investigation of alleged grave violations of humanitarian law,” 
including the use of CMs “in the heart of built-up areas.”89 Such a 
practice, the ACRI stated in its appeal, “represents a blatant violation 
of humanitarian law, both because this weaponry cannot be 
 
4 DISARMAMENT FORUM 3, 3 (2006) (indicating his view that cluster munitions 
should be banned via legally binding regulations). 
 86. Stephen D. Goose, Cluster Munitions: Ban Them, ARMS CONTROL TODAY,  
Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 6, 6, 8 (stating that Norway led a process to ban cluster 
munitions, and summarizing the U.S. opposition to a possible ban on CMs); U.S. 
White Paper, supra note 73 (supporting the CCW Protocol V and encouraging 
other states to support the Protocol, as well); Doug Tuttle, U.S. Cluster Munitions 
Policy, CTR. FOR DEF. INFO., Feb. 22, 2008, 
http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=4216 (“In [its White 
Paper], the United States clearly outlines its unwillingness to join the international 
effort to ban cluster bombs.”). 
 87. Associated Press, Norway Leads Move to Ban Cluster Bombs Despite 
Objections of U.S., FOX NEWS, Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
0,2933,230278,00.html. 
 88. See WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 35, ¶ 14. The commission was 
appointed under Basic Law: The Government, 2001, § 7(a) (Isr.), available at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic14_eng.htm (last visited May 14, 
2010) (designating to a Knesset Member the power to form the government body). 
 89. Letter from Dan Yakir, ACRI Chief Legal Counsel & Sonia Boulos, 
Attorney, to Dr. Eliyahu Winograd, Head of the Government Appointed 
Investigative Committee, Prime Minister’s Office (Sep. 25, 2006), available at 
http://www.acri.org.il/eng/print.aspx?id=340. 
BARAK_AUTHOR CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2010  9:31 AM 
444 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:423 
accurately aimed at concrete military targets, and because these 
explosive devices, in practice, turn the targeted territory into a 
minefield that endangers the civilian population.”90  
In July 2007 and in response to a second appeal, Justice Winograd 
announced that “the panel’s final report [will] examine the war’s 
[compliance with] . . . international law.”91 On January 30, 2008, the 
Committee submitted its final report, which indeed included a 
chapter on Israel’s compliance with international law, including a 
special six-page appendix on the use of CMs.92 
Given its status as a governmental investigation commission, it 
was obvious that Winograd’s findings would have far reaching 
implications. Therefore, heavy censorship was imposed to prevent 
release of any reference to CM use found in its report.93 This step 
seemed appropriate due to Israel’s diplomatic entanglement with the 
United States, which still needed to be resolved. The entanglement’s 
origin was in U.S. suspicions that Israel had violated its legislation as 
well as a 1976 classified bilateral End-Use Agreement (“1976 
Agreement”) (with added assurances and clarifications from April 
1978), specifying the conditions for employing U.S.-made CMs.94  
 
 90. Id. 
 91.  See Yuval Azoulay, Panel to Probe Alleged IDF War Crimes in Second 
Lebanon War, HAARETZ, July 27, 2007, available at http://www.haaretz.com/ 
hasen/spages/885676.html (noting that Justice Winograd’s announcement was 
partially in response to calls from Zehava Gal-On, a left-wing member of Knesset 
for the Meretz-Yahad party, and parents of soldiers for investigation of “ethical 
misconduct” in regards to Israel's extensive use of CMs during the war). 
 92. See WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, 481-94 (Ch. 14, Israel's 
compliance with International Law), 495-500 (the CMs appendix). 
 93. Cf. Dan Izenberg, Winograd Report in English Due Monday, JERUSALEM 
POST, Apr. 25, 2007, http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=59202 (stating 
that the Committee would release only a censored summary report to the public, 
though it presented the full uncensored report to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud 
Olmert and the Minister of Defense). The Committee had been strongly criticized 
for failing to release complete and uncensored testimonies from its hearings. Id. 
 94. See David S. Cloud, Inquiry Opened into Israeli Use of U.S. Bombs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006, at A1 (announcing that the U.S. State Department's Office 
of Defense Trade Controls Compliance (“DTCC”) launched an inquiry into Israel's 
use of U.S.-made CMs in late August 2006). See generally, Eitan Barak, Doomed 
to be Violated? The U.S.–Israeli Clandestine End-User Agreement and The 
Lessons of the Second Lebanon War: Lessons for the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (2010) (detailing the Israeli-U.S. 
diplomatic entanglement, its impact on the CCM, the legal implications of Israel's 
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The absence of any mention of CMs from the declassified 150-
page Interim Report of April 2007 might be justified given its focus 
on the decision-making preceding the war’s outbreak.95 The same 
cannot be said, however, of similar absences from the censored 
testimony of Israel’s Attorney General (“AG”) Meni Mazuz and of 
the MAG before the Committee despite the fact—indicated in the 
Final Report—that the two were repeatedly questioned on this 
issue.96 Furthermore, whereas other chapters may contain an opening 
footnote stating that “[t]his chapter was reviewed by the censor,” the 
opening footnote of the special six-page appendix of this massive 
report, devoted to the issue of CMs, reads: “[p]arts of the 
unclassified report were deleted from the document.”97 Needless to 
say, neither the diplomatic entanglement nor the 1976 Agreement 
with the United States, are acknowledged.98  
More importantly, the Commission’s decision to refrain from 
examining individual claims of IHL violations, despite press reports 
that at least one member (Professor Ruth Gavison) privately defined 
CM use as a “war crime,” suggests that its members well-understood 
the issue’s sensitivity.99 As expected, its decision to make do with 
 
alleged violations of U.S. legislation, and the classified 1976 bilateral End-Use 
Agreement). 
 95. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 24. 
 96. For Mendelblit's testimony transcript, published on Dec. 18, 2007, see 
Brigadier-General Avihai Mendelblit, Testimony before Winograd Commission, 
http://www.vaadatwino.org.il/statements.html#null (last visited May 14, 2010). For 
a discussion of Mazuz's testimony, see Mazuz to Winograd: IDF Acted in 
Accordance with International Law, YNETNEWS.COM, Dec. 18, 2007, 
http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3484207,00.html. 
 97. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, CMs appendix, 495, n. 1. For a 
different version of the text see, e.g., 481, n.1 (Ch. 14, Israel's compliance with IL). 
 98. A single implicit reference is to be found: "As aforesaid, limitations on the 
use of weaponry [i.e. CMs] can be derived from other sources, aside from 
international law, such as the army’s orders or agreements with other countries." 
See WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 498, ¶ 13 (emphasis added). 
 99. According to the report, Professor Gavison was personally informed of the 
large-scale use of CMs by a MLRS veteran and reacted strongly against those 
involved. This followed the soldier's testimony that when employing CMs 
extensively, his battalion's commanders assumed that the MLRS's HDR is 20%.  
The soldier, however, later sent a formal detailed letter to the Commission but was 
not invited to testify. The Commission spokesman responded that Prof. Gavison "is 
not in the habit of commenting on her personal conversations." See Meron 
Rapoport, Roger, Over and Out, HAARETZ, Oct. 19, 2007, at 10 (translated from 
Hebrew by Caan Rut Avor). 
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general conclusions—because, in part, “[w]e did not find it 
appropriate to use the large scale of materials brought to us for this 
purpose in order to deal with issues that relate to a political and 
propaganda war against the state”100—attracted much criticism in 
Israel and abroad.101 The ACRI, for instance, defined the latter 
argument as “troubling and repugnant” and called for a non-military 
independent criminal investigation into the responsibility of those 
involved in firing CMs at populated areas.102  
Nonetheless, from a review of the uncensored portions, aided by 
the MAG’s legal opinion and recently available Israeli sources, seven 
lessons can be drawn. Taken together, they point to the salience and 
need for a new convention, as well as the weaknesses of the CMs 
Draft Protocol—should it be put into effect in the future. 
LESSON 1: ON THE FEASIBILITY OF NEGLIGIBLE HDR 
Undeniably, concern over CM post-conflict duds nurtured 
international support for the CCM. It seems, therefore, that the 
United States, a prominent but certainly the most vocal opponent of 
the CCM, tried to address this concern in its dual attempt to avoid a 
total ban on CMs.103 First, in a propagandist manner, it argued that 
 
 100. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 485. 
 101. See, e.g., Gideon Levi, The Lighthouses Have Been Shut Down, HAARETZ, 
Feb. 3, 2008, at B1 (illustrating domestic criticism); see also Amnesty Int’l, Israel: 
Winograd Commission Disregards Israeli War Crimes, Jan. 31, 2008, 
PRE01/032/2008 (presenting Amnesty International’s own research on the number 
of Lebanese civilians killed during Israeli offensives in order to counter the 
Commission’s dismissal of the need to investigate serious violations of 
international humanitarian law); Richard Boudreaux, Israel Criticized for Cluster 
Bombs, Panel Questions Adequacy of Controls on Devices’ Use in 2006 Lebanon 
War, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008, at A8 (outlining national and international criticism 
for the Commission’s failure to look into allegations that Israel violated 
international humanitarian law during the war). 
 102. ACRI, Response Following Publication of the Final Report, Feb. 3, 2008, 
http://www.acri.org.il/Story.aspx?id=1678. The response stressed that "the 
investigation's essence as a viable tool in democratic operation is based on the 
ability to review a matter in depth and thoroughly and not according to it may be 
perceived in Israel or abroad". Id. 
 103. See, e.g., Kim Murphy, Britain Deals a Setback to U.S.; Brown Overrules 
His Military and Joins in Cluster Bomb Ban, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2008, at A1 
(quoting U.S. officials’ position to not join any international effort banning CMs 
but instead to convene a meeting solely of the world’s CM producers and users to 
discuss controlling their use and proper technological functioning of the weapons). 
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CMs in fact “constitute a small portion of the total humanitarian 
threat presented by . . . [conventional unexploded munitions],” and, 
as the argument goes, no “redundant treaty mechanisms” are needed 
beyond the existing ones, located in the CCW 1996 Amended 
Protocol II on Mines and Booby-Traps and Protocol V on ERW.104  
The Second Lebanon War suggests a flaw in the U.S. argument. 
Given the large-scale fire power employed, the use of CMs was quite 
limited, less than 10% of total projectiles.105 While any high-
explosive shell is a potential dud, one M-26 MLRS Rocket with its 
644 M77 bomblets and, according to field tests, a minimum 5% 
HDR, means at least 32 potential duds.106 The some 1800 rockets 
fired were indeed a scant portion of the 173,293 Israeli artillery 
projectiles and rockets fired;107 yet, they were, in effect, capable of 
releasing more than a million bomblets.108  
After the failure of the first method, the second U.S. attempt 
concentrated on a technical solution, i.e., provision of a “new 
generation” of CMs that left almost no duds.109 Indeed, the 
November 2009 Draft Protocol , which accurately reflected the U.S. 
 
 104. DOUG TUTTLE, CENTER FOR DISEASE INFORMATION, U.S. CLUSTER 
MUNITIONS POLICY (2008), http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm 
?documentID=4216; U.S. White Paper, supra note 73 (“States need to remain 
focused on comprehensive post-conflict clearance of all explosive hazards, using 
the lessons that have already been learned from decades of successful humanitarian 
clearance of landmines."). 
 105. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 46 
(citing a study conducted by three Norwegian organizations and a separate study 
by the MACC-SL on the failure rate of cluster munitions launched by Israel during 
the war). 
 106. See id. at 30 (referencing reports of the U.S. Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to Congress on the failure 
rate of cluster munitions). 
 107. Id. at 37 (outlining the factors used by the MACC-SL to estimate the total 
number of CMs Israel dropped in Lebanon). 
 108. Id. at 37-38 (providing U.N. estimates of the number of dangerous 
unexploded submunitions based on U.N. calculations of the failure rates of the 
artillery cluster shells, MLRS rockets, and CBU-58B cluster bombs fired by 
Israel). 
 109. See Stephen D. Mull, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Pol.-Mil. Aff., On-the-
Record Briefing: U.S. Cluster Munitions Policy (May 21, 2008), available at 
http://geneva.usmission.gov/CD/updates/0521ClusterStephMull.html (stating that 
the United States would advocate for solutions that ensured that the cluster 
munitions used would detonate immediately upon contact with designated military 
targets rather than later when civilians may be in the area). 
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position in this case, proposed two alternative technological 
requirements: (a) that each bomblet possess at least one safeguard 
(e.g., a self-destruct mechanism) to effectively ensure it “will no 
longer function as [an] explosive submunition[]”; and (b) 
incorporation of “a mechanism or design which, after dispersal, 
results in no more than 1% unexploded ordnance across the range of 
intended operational environments” (e.g., desert or woody terrain).110  
However, this technology already exists, with an advanced type —
the M85 bomblet—already tested in a real combat situation (the 2006 
Lebanon War).111 As expected, its performance in the 2006 War 
attracted considerable attention among CCM supporters and 
opponents alike. A sixty-four-page, detailed study, conducted by the 
Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (“FFI”) and British 
explosive ordinance experts, found that its HDR actually topped 
10%.112 As of June 2007, the Mine Action Co-ordination Centre 
South Lebanon (“MACC-SL”) has estimated that the M85 HDR, 
given the number of duds found on the ground after the 2006 War, as 
“between 5% and 10%.”113 In contrast, relying on the 2003 use of 
 
 110. GGE-CCW, Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions, supra note 17, art. 4, ¶ 2; 
see also Stephen Mathias, Head of the U.S. Delegation, Points on Humanitarian 
Benefit of Draft Protocol (Nov. 6, 2008), available at 
http://www.ccwtreaty.com/statements/1106HumanitarianBenefit.html 
(emphasizing the United States’ strong support for the two alternatives presented 
by the Chairman of the GGE in its fifth session in November 2008). 
 111. See Military Industry, YEDIOTH AHARANOT (Special Issue), Apr. 26, 2004, 
at 8 (noting that already by 2004, Israel Military Industries Ltd. (“IMI”), a 
government-owned weapons manufacturer, successfully produced more than 60 
million innovative and highly reliable CMs (M85 dual purpose bomblets with a 
declared Hazardous Dud Rate (“HDR”) as low as 0.06%)). The HDR's dramatic 
reduction is achieved by the inclusion of a Self-Destruct Fuse (“SDF”) which is 
operated once bomblets fail to detonate upon impact. 
 112. See COLIN KING ET AL., M85: AN ANALYSIS OF RELIABILITY 15 (Richard 
Moyes ed., 2007) (acknowledging that detonation tests by M85 manufacturers and 
military personnel who use them grossly underestimate the actual failure rates of 
the M85 bomblets in real combat). 
 113. Chris Clarke, Unexploded Bombs and Submunitions in South Lebanon: 
Reliability from a Field Perspective, in HUMANITARIAN, MILITARY, TECHNICAL 
AND LEGAL CHALLENGES OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS 41, 42 (2007) (countering the 
one percent failure rate that military users assert). But see id. at 43 (noting the 
criticism to the five to ten percent failure rate data presented by Mr. Clarke; the 
criticism consists in that MACC-SL could not have correctly estimated the rate 
simply based on counting the munitions that MACC-SL found on the ground after 
the war). 
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M85 in Iraq by U.K. forces (some 2,000 bombs), Adam Ingram, the 
U.K.’s Minister of State for Armed Forces, stated in June 2003 that it 
has a proven maximum failure rate of 2%—an estimate he changed 
to 5% in November 2006.114 Given such varied estimates, an 
examination of the Winograd Commission Final Report should prove 
interesting.  
Based on the vast material at its disposal, the Commission refused 
to accept, as is, the declared HDR of the various types of CMs used. 
Given that, its most important finding concerns the Israeli-made M85 
bomblets: Instead of the declared HDR of 0.06%, the Commission 
estimated the M85 HDR as ranging from 0.5% to 3%!115 In sum, 
albeit a declared negligible failure rate, it seems that M85 bomblets 
performed poorly in Southern Lebanon’s terrain given their high 
reputation as the best of their kind.  
As the declared HDR was drawn from extensive experimental 
results, it suggests a significant gap between “laboratory conditions” 
and real-time combat conditions—as already argued by various 
NGOs.116 More importantly, under the proposed Draft Protocol, 
employment of a CM weapon is permissible if no significant post-
conflict civilian harm is anticipated due to the use of new CMs with 
a negligible HDR (less than 1 percent).117 However, in the wake of 
 
 114. See LANDMINE ACTION, BAN THE "M85" CLUSTER BOMB: FACT-SHEET, 
available at 
http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/ActionPacks/m85_factsheet.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2009) (dismissing U.K. failure rate estimates based on inconsistent 
statements made by the U.K. between June 2003 and May 2007 on the BL755 and 
M26 cluster munitions, as well as the lack of tests conducted by the United 
Kingdom on the CMs during field operations). 
 115. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 495, n. 4. 
 116. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 45-
46, 48 (comparing the 1.3-2.3% failure rate under testing conditions for the self-
destructing M85 munitions with the 10% actual failure rate reported by three 
Norwegian organizations for the M85, and noting the higher failure rates of CMs 
fired at short-range and in areas where there is dense vegetation or soft ground to 
“catch” CMs, which would not have been tested); see also Colin King, Testing 
Times: Unrealistic Reliability Trials Disguise Cluster Munitions Failure Rates, 41 
JANE’S INT’L DEF. REV. 30, 30-31 (May 2008) (explaining that human error from 
stress and exhaustion during combat, launching munitions one-by-one in tests 
versus launching them simultaneously at other times, and cushioning landscapes 
account for the difference in failure rates during tests than in real situations). 
 117. See GGE-CCW, Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions, supra note 17, art. 
4.2(b) (stating that a State Party to the Protocol is prohibited from using, 
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the 2006 War, this state of affairs appears unfeasible, all the while 
remembering that this option is considered more effective in 
ensuring less civilian harm than the first option proposed by the 
Draft Protocol according to which CM weapons use is permissible 
once the CM possess at least one effective safeguard, such as a self-
destruct or self-neutralization mechanism.118  
According to the Draft Protocol, this condition would come into 
effect only after a long transition period (eight to fifteen years, with 
an extension option of up to five years in the 2008 draft, to be 
reduced to eight years with an extension option of up to four years in 
the 2009 draft) following the Protocol’s EIF.119 The Winograd 
Commission’s estimate that the true HDR of the popular U.S.-made 
CM shells (M42 and M46 bomblets that enjoy an official HDR of 
five percent) ranges between twelve percent and eighteen percent120 
suggests that the transition period under the Draft Protocol is highly 
risky with respect to avoiding a humanitarian crisis due to an 
extensive use of CMs. Needless to say, no such a transition period 
exists under the CCM.121  
LESSON 2: THE WORRISOME IMPLICATIONS OF 
“NEGLIGIBLE HDR”  
Some NGOs and CM ban supporters have already expressed the 
concern that employing CMs with a presumably meaningless HDR 
may lead to increased use of CMs due to the assumed decrease in 
 
developing, producing, or otherwise acquiring CMs, unless the CM can be 
"delivered accurately to a pre-defined target area” and is designed to “result in no 
more than 1% unexploded ordnance” in the area in which the CM is operational).   
 118. See id. art. 4.2(a) (advancing that two other safeguards include ensuring 
that submunitions have a self-deactivating feature or two or more "initiating 
mechanisms").  
 119. Id. art. 4.3. But see Steve Goose, Co-Chair of the Cluster Munitions Coal., 
Hum. Rts. Watch, CMC Statement on Article 4, General Prohibitions and 
Restrictions at the Convention on Conventional Weapons (“CCW”) Group of 
Governmental Experts (“GGE”) on Cluster Munitions (Nov. 3, 2008) [hereinafter 
Goose, CMC Statement] (criticizing the potential thirteen- to twenty-year deferral 
period as a effectively allowing states to continue to use CMs during the transition 
period). In my view, the 2009 reduction of the potential deferral period to twelve 
years makes little difference in this respect.  
 120. See WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 495, n.4. 
 121. See id. The Commission, however, accepted the M-77 bomblets' 5 percent 
declared HDR (“MLRS”). Id. 
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post-conflict duds122 and, it follows, the intended user’s decreased 
apprehensions. As such, the probable 2.4 percent gap between the 
would-be user’s estimate and the actual results is quite significant.  
Considering the Winograd report and the MAG’s legal opinion, 
we must conclude that this unease is realistic. The IDF’s inquiry 
revealed, in retrospect, that in only one case were CMs fired into 
populated Lebanese territory without any military justification 
whatsoever, with the incident indeed defined as a deviation by all 
involved.123 When reviewing this case, the MAG noted that the 
commanders who ordered the firing made sure that Israeli-made 
CMs were used to minimize HDR.124 This admission is most 
alarming as it suggests that once armies are equipped with 
presumably dud-free CMs, restraints over CM use motivated by post-
conflict dud effects are considerably weakened. Apparently, given 
the declared HDRs of these dud-free CMs, this fear should diminish. 
However, as suggested earlier, the declared HDRs are far from 
reliable measures;125 as such, increased deployment of CMs may 
sustain the current level of their large-scale post-conflict harm.  
LESSON 3: ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-VIOLENT 
PRECAUTIONS  
Whereas the post-conflict dud effects are widely discussed in the 
Winograd Report, there is no equivalent discussion regarding the 
widespread collateral damage from Israel’s extensive use of CMs 
observed during the fighting. The reason for this is quite simple. 
Contrary to what one might expect given the magnitude of CM use, 
the Committee clearly stated: “We should note that we did not hear 
any claims regarding civilian injuries from cluster bombs during the 
war.”126 Indeed, even HRW in its February 2008 comprehensive 
report counted very few “time of attack casualties” and therefore 
 
 122. Goose, CMC Statement, supra note 119 (emphasizing the flawed nature of 
provision 4.2(b) because of the inconsistency in the testing methods used by states 
to determine failure rates as well as the inaccuracy of testing methods in 
determining actual failure rates). 
 123. MAG's Legal Opinion, supra note 25, ¶ 20. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (describing some of the factors 
that make failure rates unreliable). 
 126. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 497 (emphasis in original). 
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focused on “civilian harm” in the chapter on post-conflict effects.127 
Such a surprising gap between large-scale CM use and the marginal 
collateral damage during its firing requires an explanation, especially 
because this gap limited, a priori, the Committee’s discussion of 
CMs to their post-conflict effects.  
An explanation for this phenomenon, though absent from the 
Winograd Report itself, is detailed in the MAG’s legal opinion and 
briefly mentioned in Israel’s formal response to the HRW’s report: 
Israel issued advance warnings to the local Lebanese residents.128 
Those warnings—required by Article 57(2)(c) of the 1977 Protocol I 
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions prescribing that “effective advance 
warning . . . be given of attacks . . . affect[ing] the civilian 
population”129—were made using various means such as dropping 
 
 127. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 52 
(recounting stories of civilians who suffered injuries or were killed as a result of 
submunitions exploding while they were clearing away debris around their homes 
after the war ended); see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, WHY THEY DIED: CIVILIAN 
CASUALTIES IN LEBANON DURING THE 2006 WAR 80-178, Appendix I (2007) 
[hereinafter HUM. RTS. WATCH, WHY THEY DIED] (listing civilian casualties 
during the war from CMs and other weapons, and detailing the circumstances 
leading to the civilian deaths). 
 128. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 123-
24 (explaining that Israel issued advance warnings to civilians in the form of radio 
transmissions, leaflet distributions, and via local leaders to evacuate Hezbollah-
controlled areas and weapons stores); see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, WHY THEY 
DIED, supra note 127, at 67-68 (reprinting IDF flyers distributed to Lebanese 
officials and residents south of the Litani River, warning of impending IDF attacks 
in their areas and instructing them to vacate the area for their own safety). 
 129. Protocol I: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I) of 8 June 1977, in PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 art. 57 (2) (c) (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross 
1996); see also Prosecutor v. Kupre[ki], Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 524 
(Jan. 14, 2000) (reinforcing that Articles 57 and 58 of the First Additional Protocol 
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions constitute customary international law, which 
binds Israel to compliance with these provisions even though Israel is not party to 
the First Additional Protocol); Christopher Greenwood, Customary Law Status of 
the 1977 Geneva Protocols, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 
CHALLENGES AHEAD: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FRITS KALSHOVEN 100, 111 (Astrid 
J. M. Delissen & Gerard J Tanja, eds., 1991) (asserting that Article 57 of the First 
Additional Protocol manifests customary international law; whereas, Article 58 
could easily gain recognition as customary international law because it contains 
practices that states would widely follow or feel a sense of legal obligation to 
follow). But see CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL 
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leaflet warnings, radio broadcasts,130 direct telephone messages to 
thousands of Lebanese families and, in some cases, direct telephone 
contact with local Lebanese leaders. Furthermore, “[t]hose warnings 
were extensively and persistently echoed in the leading Lebanese and 
Arab media” and, as the MAG concluded, they managed to 
“convince the residents to leave the area.”131  
Nonetheless, such a mass evacuation should be ascribed to a much 
more “convincing” means, left unmentioned in both official sources 
(the Winograd Report and the MAG legal opinion): an organized 
IDF plan for evacuating 170 villages, employing massive artillery 
barrages. As recently exposed in one of the IDF’s official journals, 
“[t]he firing was firstly directed to the villages’ periphery and after a 
short pause, to their center.”132 The fact is, CMs are neither 
designated to nor capable of harming civilians hiding in bomb 
shelters.133  
Much can be said on the legality of this act, irrespective of its 
minimal collateral damage in terms of human life. However, for this 
article’s purposes, other than providing an explanation for the 
mentioned gap and minimal collateral damage from CM use, this 
statement is cited to disperse the impression that non-violent 
 
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶ 
2223 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) (noting that in cases where "the element of 
surprise in the attack is a condition of its success," the provision allows for 
derogation by including the phrase "unless circumstances do not permit"). See 
generally Convention Regarding the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, 2 SUPP. 
AM. J. INT’L L. 90 (1908); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES 
UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 125-28 (2004) (explaining 
the requirement that states must take specific actions to avoid civilian casualties 
while planning a military attack, and its origin in the Hague Regulations 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land Annexed to Hague Convention 
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907). 
 130. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing Israeli efforts to 
warn the civilian population). 
 131. See MAG's legal opinion, supra note 25, ¶ 11. 
 132. See Brigadier-General (Reserve) Ya'acov Zigdon, Much Fire, Little 
Thinking, 420-21 MA'ARACHOT [IDF's official journal], Sept. 2008, at 44. 
 133. See General Sir Hugh Beach, Cluster Bombs: The Case for New Controls, 
INT’L SECURITY INFO. SERV. EUROPE 13 (Annex C: Alternatives to Cluster Bombs: 
The British Case) (citing a report claiming that cluster bombs are most effective on 
penetrating “soft-skinned military vehicles,” rather than thick cement bomb 
shelters, and distinguishing cluster bombs from anti-tank cluster weapons designed 
to penetrate heavily-armored tanks). 
BARAK_AUTHOR CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2010  9:31 AM 
454 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:423 
warnings are sufficient to initiate the mass evacuations necessary to 
minimize collateral damage in areas designated for CM attacks.  
LESSON 4: IHL FLEXIBILITY AND ITS INCAPACITY TO 
PREVENT FURTHER POST-CONFLICT DISASTERS  
On November 19, 2006, the then IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant-
General Dan Halutz, in an unprecedented move, stated that the use of 
CMs often constituted a clear violation of his explicit order not to 
fire into populated zones.134  
His announcement was apparently due to the results of an initial 
IDF “operational inquiry into the use of cluster munitions throughout 
the Israeli-Lebanese conflict,”135 conducted by Brigadier General 
Michael Ben-Baruch, the IDF’s Ground Forces Command, according 
to Halutz’s request. Ben-Baruch’s probe had found that while the 
Israeli Air Force (“IAF”) had complied with Halutz’s order, the same 
order was ignored by the Artillery Corps, which fired thousands of 
cluster bombs “mainly in the War’s last days.”136 More importantly, 
as part of his announcement, Halutz assigned the Commander of the 
IDF’s Military College, Major General Gershon Ha’cohen, “to look 
into the implementation of all orders and instructions regarding the 
use of cluster type munitions, in the course of the conflict.”137 
Ha’cohen’s findings, as detailed in the Winograd Final Report and 
the MAG’s legal opinion, in effect provide a favorable picture. 
 
 134. See Nir Hason & Meron Rapoport, Chief of Staff Is to Appoint a Major 
General to Inquire into Use of Cluster Rockets, HAARETZ, Nov. 20, 2006, at A1 
(reporting Halutz's announcement, which was made on November 19, 2006 via the 
major Israeli TV channels' evening news programs); Yossi Joshua, IDF Fired 
Cluster Bombs Contrary to the Chief of Staff's Order, YEDIOT AHARONOT, Nov. 
20, 2006, at 2 (reporting Halutz’s announcement). 
 135. Israel Probes Use of Cluster Bombs during War with Hizbollah, 
WORLDTRIBUNE.COM, Nov. 22, 2006, 
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2006/me_israel_11_21.html 
(quoting a military statement). 
 136. Hason & Rapoport, supra note 134, at 2. 
 137. IDF Spokesperson Announcement, Maj. Gen. Ha’cohen Appointed to 
Inquire the Circumstances of the Use of Cluster Munitions During the Israeli-
Lebanese Conflict, Nov. 20, 2006, available at  
http://thehague.mfa.gov.il/mfm/Data/104928.pdf; accord Greg Myre, Israel 
Orders Investigation of Bomb Use in Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at A8 
(reporting in the United States on Lieutenant General Halutz’s call for an 
investigation of IDF’s use of CMs during the 2006 Lebanon war). 
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According to both sources, CM use was subjected to three strict 
limitations: a) proper safety ranges; b) mapped firing zone; and c) the 
Chief of Staff’s approval for each firing.138  
The story seems simple: an order by the IDF Chief of Staff 
forbidding CM firings in populated areas did exist.139 While IAF use 
of air-dropped CMs met all three demands, all those involved in 
cases of artillery-delivered CMs (excluding one which was found 
deviant by the Northern Command) “acted in this matter according to 
the instructions and orders given . . . by their supervising 
headquarters.”140 The one exception was the Wartime Officer in 
Command (“O.C.”), the Northern Command, Major General 
(Reserve) Udi Adam, with respect to whom, the MAG noted, “some 
flaws were found in his actions.”141 Given the circumstances, 
however, the MAG decided that “there is no room at present for 
disciplinary or other measures against the [Northern] Command’s 
O.C.”142 While Adam’s “few flaws” were not detailed, the absence of 
any legal action taken against him was explained by the MAG as 
follows: (a) Adam had already resigned his post and left the army; 
(b) much more importantly, his flaws were on the “professional level 
(unlike the moral or legal level, in the sense that no deviation from 
Israel’s duties according to international law was found).”143  
With reference to the CM Draft Protocol, a long transition period 
had been proposed between the Protocol’s entry into force—during 
which use of “older-generation” CMs is allowed under specified 
conditions, the first condition being approval by “the highest-
ranking operational commander in the area of operations or by the 
appropriate politically mandated operational authority, in accordance 
with its national procedure.”144  
 
 138. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 497. 
 139. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, WHY THEY DIED, supra note 127, at 238-39 
(commenting that IDF soldiers knew that they should not target cluster munitions 
at civilians because Order No. 33.0133 issued by the IDF Chief of Staff mandated 
them to conform their actions to the Geneva Conventions). 
 140. MAG's Legal Opinion , supra note 25, ¶ 48. 
 141. Id. ¶ 46. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. ¶ 47. 
 144. GGE-CCW, Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions, supra note 17, arts. 
4.4(a)-5 (emphasis added) (obligating States Parties to the Protocol to implement 
the restricted use of CMs with permission from one of these two sources, and to 
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The Northern Command’s O.C., Adam, met the “highest-ranking 
operational comander” criterion.145 However, the IDF findings 
implicate Adam as the officer responsible for the violations; the 
lower echelons only obeyed his orders.146 Adam may indeed be to 
blame. Alternatively, Israel might be sacrificing him in order to 
evade the threatened U.S. sanctions following the State Department’s 
inquiry into possible violations of its legislation regarding use of 
American-made CMs.147 In either case, this incident suggests that the 
CM Draft Protocol’s important condition for avoiding a humanitarian 
crisis during the lengthy transition period is far from foolproof. 
Indeed, although it is less likely that a senior officer (as opposed to a 
junior officer) will err in this regard, the 2006 War demonstrated 
how weak this assumption may be in the field.  
Second, much more alarming and, as such, a strong argument in 
favor of the CCM, is MAG’s argument that despite the magnitude of 
CM use against the relatively populated area of South Lebanon, the 
deployment was still in full compliance with IHL. In a nutshell, 
Israel’s extensive use of CMs—which, as the MAG stressed, is “a 
legal weapon which does not inflict superfluous injury on the enemy 
 
also take steps not to develop new CMs that would be prohibited under the 
protocol, to technologically improve the accuracy and failure rate of the new CMs 
produced, and to pare down stores of CMs to only the amount necessary for 
military operations). 
 145. See Yaakov Katz, Security and Defense: Udi Adam’s War, JERUSALEM 
POST, July 20, 2006, available at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=11 
53291961904&pagename=JPArticle%2FShowFull (reporting that the IDF 
employed a new command structure during the second Lebanon war in which 
Major-General Udi Adam, the Northern Command’s O.C., was in charge of all 
IDF ground, navy, and air forces in the Lebanon operation zone, rather than just 
ground forces). 
 146. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 97-
98 (observing that soldiers attributed command responsibility for the firing of CMs 
to the land forces command, headed by Major-General Adam, who, as they 
alleged, ordered all use of CMs). 
 147. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing the investigation of 
Israeli misuse of U.S.-made bombs); see also JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV. REP. FOR CONGRESS, U.S. FOREIGN AID TO ISRAEL 7-8 (2008), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf (reporting on the 
potential end of aid to Israel under the Arms Export Control Act, following the 
U.S. Department of State’s preliminary conclusion that Israel may have violated a 
classified bilateral procurement agreement restricting the use of cluster bombs in 
civilian-populated areas). 
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(i.e., within the principle of humanity)”148—was legal as there was 
(1) a concrete military necessity to prevent rockets being fired at 
Israel; and (2) the principles of distinction and proportionality were 
maintained because the CMs were fired exclusively at military 
targets and only after it was determined that the potential collateral 
damage was not disproportionate to the military advantage gained.149 
In practice, the MAG held the view that excluding the clear deviation 
already mentioned and an additional case in which CMs were used to 
assist in evacuating forces,150 CMs were used in populated areas 
solely as an immediate defensive response to rocket attacks after 
non-combatants were evacuated from these same targets.151 That is, 
all the uses, save one, were lawful. 
A critical review of the MAG’s analysis deserves a separate article 
and, more importantly, has little to do with this article’s purpose. 
Analyses of CM legality per se152 and of the legality of CM use in 
 
 148. MAG's Legal Opinion, supra note 25, ¶ 38 ; see also Herthel, supra note 
30, at 257-59 (presenting the debate among legal scholars as to whether the 
criticisms that CMs cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering should 
warrant banning them as inhumane when they also serve significantly useful 
military functions); Karen Hulme, Of Questionable Legality: The Military Use of 
Cluster Bombs in Iraq in 2003, in THE CANADIAN BRANCH, INT’L LAW ASS’N & 
THE CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INT’L LAW, THE CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 143, 165-69 (2004) (postulating on the characterization of 
CMs as causing “unnecessary suffering” based on the amount of bodily damage 
that they can cause when smaller fragments come in contact with the human body); 
Thomas M. McDonnell, Cluster Bombs Over Kosovo: A Violation of International 
Law?, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 31, 66-74 (2002) (assessing whether the use of CMs 
satisfies the balancing test that governs the prohibition of weapons causing 
superfluous injury in light of criteria proposed by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross on the foreseeability of the injuries that may be caused by the CM’s 
design). See generally Henri Meyrowitz, The Principle of Superfluous Injury or 
Unnecessary Suffering, 299 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 98, 98-122 (1994) (detailing 
the history of the principle of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and its 
application through the Hague Regulations and First Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1977). 
 149. See MAG's Legal Opinion, supra note 25, ¶¶ 32-39. For a summary of this 
argument see WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 498, ¶ 10. 
 150. MAG's Legal Opinion, supra note 25.  In this case, the firing was at the 
Lebanese village of Maroon-A-Ras on July 20, and Halutz himself justified the use 
post facto.  Id. 
 151. See MAG’s Legal Opinion, supra note 25, ¶¶ 18-20. 
 152. See, e.g., Virgil Wiebe, Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as 
Indiscriminate Weapons Under International Humanitarian Law, 22 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 85, 104-19 (2000-2001) (assessing whether cluster bomb use constitutes 
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specific cases (e.g., Kosovo, Iraq)153 are readily available; they can 
be applied, mutatis mutandis, in this case as well. Furthermore, the 
current case has already attracted several attempts of legal analyses 
by NGOs.154 and would likely have been discussed by Israel’s High 
Court of Justice had not ACRI backed down from its intention to 
submit a petition regarding the absence of any legal action taken 
against those responsible for the extensive CM use.155  
 
indiscriminate use because of the natural geographic imprecision associated with 
their use and the ability for unexploded cluster bombs to become landmines when 
they fail to detonate on impact); Herthel, supra note 30, at 249, 265-68 (concluding 
that cluster bombs are not naturally indiscriminate because customary international 
law has not deemed them to be, and that the large area which cluster bombs can 
affect does not automatically deem them to be indiscriminate); Breitegger, supra 
note 28, at 9-13 (considering that military necessity weighed against humanitarian 
concerns might require the use of cluster munitions, providing a reason why cluster 
munitions could not be per se illegal); Van Woudenburg, supra note 3, at 454-64 
(noting the statements of commentators that no treaty or rule of customary 
international law specifically makes cluster munitions illegal, nor do they 
indirectly make them illegal by prohibiting their use, so long as they cause no 
civilian casualties). 
 153. See generally McDonnell, supra note 148 (using the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo as an example of the use of cluster bombs in order to assess whether 
international law prohibits their use altogether); cf. Hulme, supra note 148 
(analyzing whether U.S. use of cluster munitions during Operation Iraqi Freedom 
was inherently indiscriminate given the high failure rate of the CMs and other 
known factors such as the effect of geographical and weather conditions on the 
scattering of submunitions over large areas). 
 154. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, 
at 104-11 (concluding that Israel could foresee that its use of cluster munitions 
would violate international humanitarian law because of the disproportionality of 
attacks against civilian areas in the last days of the war as well as the less-than-
thorough means of communicating with Lebanese civilians to evacuate areas that 
the IDF planned to bomb). 
 155. Telephone interview with Adv. Dan Yakir, Chief Legal Counsel at ACRI, 
Oct. 29, 2008. Email correspondence, Dec. 22, 2008; May 29, 2010; May 30, 
2010. In fact, as long as there was an IDF "on-going investigation," over CM use, 
no domestic legal action was available to those Israeli NGOs and civil right 
advocates, which believed that their use constitutes an IHL violation; once the 
investigation ended and the ACRI's January 2008 request to the MAG to release 
his legal opinion still went unanswered, the ACRI turned to AG Mazuz in March 
2008, urging him to open a criminal inquiry into Israel's extensive use of the 
weapon. See Re: Opening a Criminal Inquiry over the Use of Cluster Bombs in the 
Second Lebanon War, Mar. 2, 2008, http://www.acri.org.il/Story.aspx?id=1785. 
Three months later, on June 18, 2008, the MAG released a short version of his 
legal opinion. After reviewing the opinion, the ACRI decided not to withdraw its 
appeal to Mazuz, who has refrained  from even acknowledging the ACRI's letter. 
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Nevertheless, what is important for our purposes is the 
unavoidable conclusion that states can fire millions of bomblets at 
populated areas and remain confident that their actions fully comply 
with IHL. Thus IHL, in itself, can do little to prevent future massive 
CM use, not because states adamantly choose to commit gross 
violations of IHL, but because they are confident that IHL is on their 
side. As such, it seems that only a total ban can secure the world 
against similar cases in the future.156  
LESSON 5: NONE TO BE TRUSTED: ISRAEL’S 
UNCONTROLLED CM USE  
No doubt, unlike technical issues (e.g., HDRs of various CM 
types), the Winograd Commission was more mindful of Israel’s 
formal stance when examining the core issue: Israel’s extensive CM 
use. On this issue, the Committee preferred to rely on Ha’cohen’s 
findings as to the impossibility of verifying the duds’ numbers and 
locations, dates of CMs employment, designated targets, and 
circumstances of firing.157  
This article respectfully but categorically disagrees with the 
Winograd Commission’s findings regarding this issue: the duds’ 
numbers and locations are readily available through MACC SL’s 
monthly reports.158 In addition, the last three factors are quite 
 
 156. Indeed, alternative weapons designed to cover widespread areas (area 
weapons), such as flechettes or Fuel-Air Explosive (“FAE”) bombs, may be 
equally devastating at the time of use but pose no serious post-conflict damage 
because no dud problems arise. See Fuel/Air Explosive (FAE), 
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/dumb/fae.htm (last visited May 14, 2010) 
(explaining the operation of the FAE and capacity to cause damage through release 
of a vapor cloud rather than expelling an explosive). For a comprehensive 
overview of the humanitarian concerns regarding flechettes, see  EITAN BARAK, 
DEADLY METAL RAIN: THE LEGALITY OF FLECHETTE WEAPONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW – A REAPPRAISAL FOLLOWING ISRAEL’S USE IN THE GAZA STRIP (2001-2009) 
(Christopher Greenwood & Timothy L.H. McCormack eds., Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, forthcoming 2010) (on file with the author). 
 157. See generally WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24. 
 158. See, e.g. Mine Action Coordination Ctr. S. Lebanon, Quarterly Report of 
the Mine Action Coordination Centre, South Lebanon for the Period April to June 
2007 (2007), available at http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/MACC%20 
Quarterly%20April%20-%20June%202007.pdf (charting the number of civilian 
mine incidents during the quarter, as well as the number of mines cleared in the 
time period). 
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accessible for most used CMs, and can be tracked by (digital) 
operational logbooks of any artillery unit, not to mention an IAF 
squadron logbook.159 Furthermore, all of the respective information 
has been collected by the IDF’s Investigating Officer, Ha’cohen, 
who testified before the Commission.160 The Commission indeed 
explained at length its decision to refrain from inquiring into whether 
Israel had complied with the Law of War during the Second Lebanon 
War, as well as to disregard specific cases and NGO allegations of 
IHL violations, both based on its inability to construct the 
appropriate evidentiary infrastructure. The fact that some allegations 
of IHL violations have already been reviewed or will be reviewed by 
the appropriate bodies, together with the issue of due process of 
expected IDF personnel likely to be found liable for those IHL 
violations were raised as well.  
Nevertheless, regarding Israel’s extensive CM use, the 
Commission’s explicit concern over its findings’ abuse by anti-Israel 
forces, in addition to its wariness regarding potential diplomatic 
entanglements, seems to have played a significant role in its decision 
to sidestep a truly independent, in-depth inquiry. Such an inquiry 
would, after all, have either verified or refuted Israel’s formal 
explanation, according to which firing CMs at populated areas 
entailed a clear breach of IDF orders; that explanation assisted the 
pro-Israeli Bush Administration to end the diplomatic strain resulting 
from use of U.S.-made CMs.161 Because the Winograd Commission 
refrained from scrutinizing the MAG’s findings,162 it falls upon us to 
do so with all the other sources available. These sources imply that 
the MAG’s findings regarding the well-organized and supervised 
CM use may be incomplete. Moreover, Israel’s extensive use of 
munitions in general and CMs in particular is a worrying sign for a 
world in which armed conflicts are frequent in environments having 
no bans or even use restrictions on CMs, as discussed below. 
 
 159. The IDF has no data regarding 25% of the total 173,293 projectiles and 
rockets fired. However, due to the IDF's sensitivity over CM weapons, most of its 
data refer to other type of munitions, mainly smoke and explosive shells. See 
Zigdon, supra note 132, at 51 & n.23. 
 160. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24. 
 161. Id. at 484-85. 
 162. Id. 
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In light of the Second Lebanon War’s limited geographical area 
and short duration (34 days), there is no doubt that an unprecedented 
quantity of munitions, especially CMs, were fired even considering 
Israel’s many wars. In the 1967 Six-Day War, 78,812 shells were 
fired against three regular armies (the Egyptian, Syrian, and 
Jordanian, with the assistance of Iraqi forces); in the 1973 War, 
145,000 shells were used against two regular armies (Egyptian and 
Syrian, with the assistance of the Iraqi, Jordanian, and to a lesser 
extent, Saudi forces); in the 1982 first Lebanon War, 81,230 shells 
were used; but in the 2006 Second Lebanon War, 173,293 shells and 
MLRS rockets were used.163 In contrast, Israel took control over the 
same area using only 17,000 shells (i.e., in the March 1978 the Litani 
Operation).164 The use of aerial munitions was even more 
unprecedented given the large number of sorties the IAF conducted; 
an average of 350 sorties per day, more than in the 1973 War.165 
Their daily average was reduced only when the IAF reached the red 
line of selected munition stocks.166 
No doubt, as the Winograd Commission stressed: “the quantity of 
munitions used in the Second Lebanon War was very high compared 
to former wars.”167 The real problem associated with these figures, 
however, is that this massive use of artillery was neither planned nor 
properly supervised. As the former Commander of the IDF’s Military 
College, Brigadier General (Reserve) Yaacov Zigdon discovered that 
“[t]he intensified munitions consumption and the reaching of red 
lines point to a lack of control, ignorance and lack of supervision 
over the army.”168 Israeli military commentators were much bolder in 
their criticism: “While the Israeli society was certain that the IDF 
 
 163. Zigdon, supra note 132, at 44-45. For additional data on the 1973 War, see 
ALHANAN OREN, THE YOM KIPPUR WAR: A HISTORY 322 (2004) (in Hebrew). 
 164. OFER SHELAH & YOAV LIMOR, CAPTIVES OF LEBANON 159 (2007) (in 
Hebrew). 
 165. AMOS HAREL & AVI ISSACHAROFF, SPIDER WEBS (34 DAYS) 292 (2008) (in 
Hebrew). 
 166. Id. These data are missing from the English translation (see AMOS HAREL 
& AVI ISSACHAROFF, 34 DAYS: ISRAEL, HEZBOLLAH, AND THE WAR IN LEBANON 
(Ora Cummings & Moshe Tlamim trans., 2008). On the massive air power 
employed see Genenera (Reserve) Itzhak Ben Israel, The First Missile War: Israel- 
Hizbollah, Position Paper, Tel-Aviv Univ., at 41 (2007) (in Hebrew). 
 167. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 345, ¶ 37 (emphasis in original). 
 168. Zigdon, supra note 132, at 52. 
BARAK_AUTHOR CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2010  9:31 AM 
462 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:423 
artillery fire was constrained by higher powers, in actuality the army 
[IDF], fired everything it had . . . with no control . . . without a 
higher command to regulate, monitor, and supervise the ineffective 
flood of artillery fire.”169  
Earlier press reports and personal accounts of uncontrolled 
artillery fire was recently confirmed by the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs 
and Security Committee (“FASC”), which reviewed various aspects 
of the war with all the material at hand. The FASC concluded in its 
December 2007 report—which, as an official report, was subject to a 
severe censorship and excludes any mention of CMs—that “basing 
the military campaign on the fire component brought about the 
extensive use of different types of munitions from the War’s 
breakout. Attempts to restrain consumption by the General Staff’s 
Munitions Committee were of no avail.”170 In fact, it was found that 
only on July 28, a fortnight after the war’s beginning, was the Chief 
of Staff presented with the arsenal status for the first time.171 Given 
the high munitions consumption rate reached, weekly weapons 
quotas for the various IDF units were decided.172 Nonetheless, the 
FASC found that neither the Munitions Committee nor the General 
Staff were able to enforce this decision on the operational level.173 A 
similar conclusion was reached by another official committee: the 
Defense Budget Review Committee which, in its May 2007 report, 
found that there was “highly excessive” use of munitions and that 
“no one in the army or the government had been designated with the 
task of reviewing this question and ordering any changes.”174  
And so, unlike the favorable image sketched in the MAG’s legal 
opinion, Israel’s use of munitions in general and CMs in particular 
 
 169. SHELAH & LIMOR, supra note 164, at 159. 
 170. See KNESSET FOR. AFF. & SECURITY COMM. [KFASC], LESSONS OF THE 
SECOND LEBANON WAR 113 (2007), http://portal.knesset.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/ 
215EB752-A463-4E11-88DA-E1F087A72E44/151/bitachon17_2.pdf (in Hebrew). 
 171. KFASC, supra note 170, at 113. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. THE STATE OF ISRAEL, THE DEFENSE BUDGET REVIEW COMMITTEE 90-91 
(2007), available at  http://www.pmo.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/F1FF400E-2A04-4042-
90C0-FCEDD874AF88/0/Brodet.pdf (in Hebrew). The Committee is known as the 
Brodet Committee after its head, David Brodet, former CEO of Israel's Ministry of 
Treasury. P.M. Olmert assigned the committee in November 2006 to examine the 
defense budget in the wake of the Lebanon War. 
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was unconstrained. As Hagai Alon, a former political adviser of 
wartime Minister of Defense Amir Peretz recently confessed:  
Only after the war did we, Amir and I, first learn about the 
use of cluster bombs . . . the responsible echelons in the IDF 
refused to provide me the maps [of the strike locations].175 
They wanted to hide the fact that we have fired this 
problematic weapon into populated zones like crazy. This 
was done without any higher authorization and in an 
uncontrolled manner . . . .176 
While the question remains open as to how much it was affected 
from the fact that, as scholars have already noted, revenge played a 
considerable role in Israel’s conduct during the War,177 few states, if 
any, can criticize Israel for its actions. Neither American nor British 
cities, for instance, were under rocket barrage when their armies 
employed CMs abroad (i.e., in Vietnam, Iraq, and Kosovo).178 One 
 
 175. MAG's Legal Opinion, supra note 25, ¶ 40 (noting that Israel provided 
such maps at the war’s end); see IDF spokesman: No Sweeping Prohibition, 
HAARETZ, Sep. 8, 2006, at 4 (in Hebrew); see also Interview with Mrs. Rodica 
Radian Gordon, Director, Arms Control Department, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Aff. 
(Oct. 7, 2008) (confirming that Israel provided such maps in February 2008 in 
addition to at the war’s end). But see The Secretary-General, Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 
(2006), ¶ 39, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/730 (quoting, 
"[w]hile the IDF has provided some maps . . . they are not specific enough to be of 
use to operators on the ground. I expect that Israel will provide further detailed 
information to UNIFIL regarding the exact location, quantity and type of cluster 
munitions utilized during the conflict"); Ina Friedman, Deadly Remnants, 
JERUSALEM REP., Nov. 13, 2006, at 20, 22 (reporting that Israel, in contrast, has so 
far refused to provide detailed maps with corresponding quantities, arguing that 
UNSC Res.1701 "did not require Israel to provide the GPS coordinates, as it 
speaks only of conveying to the United Nations all remaining maps of land mines 
in Lebanon in Israel's possession,” and explaining IDF Code of Conduct author 
and Professor Asa Kasher’s justification that the refusal stood Israel's interest in 
preventing exposure of its intelligence regarding the exact location of various 
Hezbollah posts). 
 176. Akiva Eldar, interview with Hagai Alon, Amir Peretz's political adviser, 
Captured in Conception, HAARETZ FRIDAY MAGAZINE, 21, 24 (July 18, 2008) (in 
Hebrew). 
 177. See Oded Löwenheim & Gadi Heimann, Revenge in International Politics, 
17 SEC. STUD. 685, 723 (2008) (arguing that this is because some states may view 
a violation of their rights as more offensive than other states would in a similar 
situation). 
 178. Hum. Rts. Watch, Survey of Cluster Munition Policy and Practice 61 (Feb. 
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can only imagine the level of munitions, including CMs, which these 
states might use should they find themselves in a similar situation.179 
The strategic bombing in WWII is a worrying sign of this tendency. 
As long as CMs are integral parts of military arsenals,180 it seems 
quite plausible that states possessing CM weapons, when facing a 
situation similar to that of Israel in 2006, would massively employ 
CMs.  
LESSON 6: ON THE CM’S ALLEGED MILITARY 
EFFECTIVENESS  
As mentioned, CMs enjoy a reputation for high military 
effectiveness. As Ambassador Mull has stated: “The United States 
relies on them as an important part of our own defense strategy. 
Many of our allies rely on them as well.”181 Therefore, it is 
interesting to assess whether this image remains warranted after the 
2006 Lebanon case as well, particularly given the prominent role that 
CMs played when compared to other conflicts in which they were 
employed. In fact, while reviewing former cases of CM use, a 2007 
study was forced to qualify its conclusion regarding the CM’s 
“Declining Military Utility” due to the lack of data from the 2006 
Lebanon case.182 As such, this lesson has unique import given the 
current debate between CCM supporters who question whether CMs 
had not become a “Cold War relic”183 and those who maintain the 
stance taken by Ambassador Mull.  
 
2007. 
 179. This question would effectively be relevant only for the United States; the 
United Kingdom has signed the CCM whereas the United States has not. See 
Convention on Cluster Munitions, Ratifications and Signatures, supra note 1. 
 180. See id. at 1-2 (acknowledging that the CM weapons category is the most in 
need of stronger laws that protect citizens because of their growing use). 
 181. Mull, supra note 109 (recognizing the effectiveness of CMs but also their 
devastating impact on civil society). 
 182. Bonnie Docherty, The Time is Now: A Historical Argument for a Cluster 
Munitions Convention, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 53, 66-69 (2007) (“The Israeli 
military has not made a statement on why it used cluster munitions in this 
circumstance or whether it judged them to be effective."). 
 183. Id. at 66-67 (noting that this question was also raised by U.S. forces (Third 
Infantry Division) which employed CMs in the 2003 war in Iraq, where the 
soldiers complained that the weapons endangered their own forces as well as 
civilians). 
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As noted previously, artillery CMs were employed to achieve 
three objectives, the first two of which provided Israel with its 
official justification for their massive use:184 (a) preventing rocket 
fire on Israel by targeting the rocket launchers (which consumed ten 
percent of total shells and rockets); (b) in the event that the rocket 
launchers could not be destroyed, limiting the amount of rockets 
fired by disrupting activities in the area (which consumed twenty 
percent of total shells and rockets; in addition to artillery CMs, 
aerially dropped CMs were used as well); and (c) providing artillery 
support for ground forces (which consumed forty percent of total 
shells and rockets).185  
With respect to the first objective, despite the six thousand cases in 
which the IDF pinpointed the launching site and instantly shelled it 
during the Second LebanonWar, mainly with CM rockets, there was 
not even one single case of a recorded success. In fact, Hezbollah’s 
ability to fire an impressive 250 rockets on the very last day of the 
War testified to this failure.186  
As for the second objective, the rationale was that constant firing 
of CMs would prevent Hezbollah’s militiamen from approaching 
their launchers. Based on intelligence data and general estimates, 
Israeli fire was executed in fifty “nature reserves” and two hundred 
villages which turned out to be launching sites—indeed, as the war 
lengthened, the amount of munitions needed became unprecedented. 
Nonetheless, legitimate187 and tactically reasonable as this objective 
was, it achieved little more than a local effect, with only a twenty 
percent reduction in launches. As the Knesset’s FASC concluded: 
 
 184. See UNHRC REPORT, supra note 77, ¶ 55 (finding that the use of CMs was 
inconsistent with principles of distinction and proportionality). 
 185. See Zigdon, supra note 132, at 48-49 (declaring that no reliable record of 
the nature of the remaining 30% of shells used exists). 
 186. Id. As Harel & Issacharoff wrote: "Even today, artillerymen are not able to 
point out a single launcher which was definitely destroyed in artillery fire.” See 
Zigdon, supra note 132, at 287. 
 187. See TIMOTHY H. MCCORMACK & PARAMDEEP B. MTHARU, EXPECTED 
CIVILIAN DAMAGE & THE PROPORTIONALITY EQUATION: INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW & EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR 9 (2006), available at 
http://www.apcml.org/documents/un_report_exp_civilian_damage_1106.pdf 
(noting that choosing CMs that leave many duds in order to prevent enemy access 
to defined areas was in fact recognized as a mid- to long-term military advantage; 
but, of course, this only applied to the nature reserves). 
BARAK_AUTHOR CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2010  9:31 AM 
466 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:423 
“[I]n spite of the extensive firing, from an analysis of our forces’ 
firing data . . . it clear that the disruption mission had only a minor 
and short-term affect. In general, it could not, in itself, influence the 
extent of rockets fired by Hezbollah.”188 
As to the third objective of Israel’s employing artillery CMs (i.e., 
minimizing IDF casualties as much as possible by relying on large 
amounts of munitions), the lack of adequate high command 
supervision was obvious. For instance, “the town Alkhiam [15,000 
inhabitants, mainly Shia Muslims] was heavily bombarded, in the 
absence of precise and clear intelligence, for no effective purpose 
and or reason.”189 According to the Knesset’s FASC, “there was also 
an excess use of munitions [used to support ground forces] given the 
needs and the fire’s limited efficiency.”190 
In sum, the near-consensus among Israeli writers quite soon after 
the war that the use of CMs in 2006 was to no avail has been 
confirmed by official Israeli sources. None of the three IDF military 
objectives approved for CMs employment justified their use given 
the humanitarian costs such weapons can incur. Hence, as this lesson 
suggests, CM military effectiveness should be reconsidered when 
facing today’s new and changing battlefield. Designated for 
traditional battlefields such as those faced in the 1973 War, during 
which regular armies and heavy armored forces fought one another, 
CMs perform poorly against small guerilla squads, which sometimes 
employ nothing but a lone launcher and are capable of evading IDF 
spotting systems.  
This lesson accords with recent research pointing to the “declining 
military utility” of CMs.191 While these studies base their conclusions 
 
 188. KFASC, supra note 170, at 113. 
 189. Zigdon, supra note 132, at 50 (recognizing that the magnitude of munitions 
for this purpose reached such a level that it was argued that in some cases relying 
on the heavy fire even replaced required maneuvers). 
 190. KFASC, supra note 170, at 51, 113 (explaining that it was clear in many 
cases that there was no proper purpose behind the fire).  As Brigadier-General 
Lorance Mualem, Chief of Artillery Corps stated, "in the absence of maneuvers, 
what is left to do, is fire!"  Id. 
 191. See, e.g., Docherty, supra note 182, at 59-61 (asserting that various 
generals and the Congressional Research Service disfavor the use of these weapons 
because of decreasing utility); see also REINHILDE WEIDACHER ET AL., CLUSTER 
WEAPONS: NECESSITY OR CONVENIENCE? 20-25 (2005) (declaring that cluster 
weapons are often being replaced with other more precise weapons with unitary 
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on recent conflicts, it is interesting to note that CMs became 
entrenched in Western military thinking following the Vietnam 
War.192 However, if one were to review the effectiveness of CMs in 
that war, one would also reach the conclusion that the United States 
apparently achieved no sustainable battlefield advantages from using 
more than 350 million bomblets of various types.193 Official U.S. 
assessments regarding use of CMs in the 1991 Operation Desert 
Storm194 and in the 1999 Kosovo Campaign, for instance—before the 
U.S. Command hurriedly replaced an unfavorable report on their use 
with a positive one195—indicate that any assessment of the weapon’s 
effectiveness may be somehow overestimated should Israel, for 
example, becomes involved in a more “traditional” war against 
Syria.196 
 
warheads). 
 192. See, e.g., Docherty, supra note 182, at 64 (noting that the country of Laos 
still suffers effects of these weapons). 
 193. Cf. PROKOSCH, supra note 32, at 112 (examining the difficulties of 
assessing the weapons' "actual impact" during that War). 
 194. See RAE MCGRATH, CLUSTER BOMBS: THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AND 
IMPACT ON CIVILIANS OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS 7 (Richard Lloyd ed., 2000) 
(recording that U.S. forces used 47,167 units containing 13,167,544 bomblets in 
Operation Desert Storm). 
 195. See id. (explaining the data given in the Defense Department Report).  See 
generally DEPT. OF DEF., KOSOVO/OPERATION ALLIED FORCE AFTER-ACTION 
REPORT (2000) (assessing the comprehensive investigation that U.S. forces 
conducted in Kosovo). 
 196. E.g., WEIDACHER ET AL., supra note 191, at 25 (basing its findings on a 
survey about CMs and military utility among forty-five countries from which 
forty-three had stockpiled these weapons, and positing that "Israel is one of very 
few Western countries still facing a possibility of massive armored attacks, a 
situation where cluster weapons have a major role”); see also Reuven Pedatzur, If 
War Breaks Out, HAARETZ, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages 
/915893.html (reporting that current military analyses on the Syrian army have 
pointed that "the Syrian army has gradually become less armored and less 
mechanized; it is more and more based on infantry, commando units and antitank 
weapons."). But see Yaakov Katz, Massive IDF Drill Prepares for Syrian Attack. 
Hundreds of Tanks Thousands of Troops in Golan War Simulation, JERUSALEM 
POST, Apr. 27, 2007, at 1 (asserting that due to an IDF post-Lebanon War large 
scale drill, "the IDF has not ruled out the possibility that a war would also entail 
tank battles, once believed to have been a relic of historic wars like the Six Day 
War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973"); Middle East Military Balance: 
Syria, INST. NAT’L SECURITY STUD. DATABASE, May 16, 2007, at 6, available at 
http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1188214444.pdf (implying that MLRS 
equipped with CMs rockets may prove to be effective in targeting mass artillery 
batteries Syria has deployed along its 1974 disengagement line with Israel border 
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LESSON 7: THE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION OF THE 
WINOGRAD COMMISSION TO THE CASE FOR THE CCM 
The conclusion from the MAG’s legal opinion, according to which 
Israel’s extensive use of CMs fully accorded with IHL, is that 
millions of bomblets can be fired at populated areas and their 
vicinity, as happened in the 2006 War.197 This seemed preposterous 
even for the Winograd Commission, but it refrained from any inquiry 
which would undermine the IDF version. Instead, it chose to focus 
on the following “legal-factual question”: 
What is the legality of Cluster Munitions firing at military target 
within civilian concentration, such as village, . . . when it is known 
that the village’s residents are temporarily absent due to the warfare, 
but it is known that they would return to their villages in its 
aftermath?198 
According to the MAG’s view,—which the committee mistakenly 
named “an extended interpretation” because the legal review was 
conducted during the warfare itself199—if the use of CMs at that time 
is in accordance with IHL, then the anticipated long-term impact of 
the duds should not affect the results. Consequently, even if the 
MAG was cognizant of the actual post-conflict effects on South 
Lebanon, he argued that such a use could accord with IHL.200 
However, the Winograd Commission rejected this view, stating 
that such an “extended interpretation . . . is inconsistent with the 
underlying rationale of the restrictions on the use of CMs.”201 
Therefore, it concluded that allowing CM use in populated areas 
 
due to the massive Syrian defense force). 
 197. See MAG’s Legal Opinion, supra note 25; see also Israel: Cluster Bomb 
Use Was Legal, CNN.COM, Dec. 25, 2007, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/12/25/israel.cluster.bombs/index.html 
(reporting that the Israeli military advocate general would not prosecute anyone 
who authorized use of the cluster bombs during the 2006 war). 
 198. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 498 (emphasis in original). 
 199. Id.; cf. Israeli Ministry of For. Aff., The Operation in Gaza: Factual and 
Legal Aspects, ¶ 251, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-
+Obstacle+to+Peace/Hamas+war+against+Israel/Operation_Gaza_factual_and_leg
al_aspects_use_of_force_IDF_conduct_5_Aug_2009.htm (reporting that Israeli 
targeting decisions during the Gaza Operation were planned in advance with 
military and legal officers). 
 200. See WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, ¶ 12. 
 201. Id. at 498. 
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“even after their residents have been temporarily evacuated” is 
unacceptable “without stringent and individual review.”202 The 
Commission then asked the IDF to ensure that its view would be 
promptly and clearly internalized by the IDF.203 
No doubt, this is an important contribution to a long standing and 
disputed issue having far-reaching implications for CMs’ legality. 
The main argument used to undermine that legality was that CMs are 
inherently indiscriminate weapons. Under the principle of 
discrimination, which, together with the “Principle of Humanity,” is 
a “cardinal principle” governing the use of conventional weapons,204 
states should never “use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing 
between civilian and military targets.”205  
 
 202. Id. But see Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, Israel: Winograd Commission 
Disregards Israeli War Crimes (Jan. 31, 2008), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/israel-winograd-commission-
disregards-israeli-war-crimes-20080131 (arguing that the Winograd Commission 
only gave token consideration to the indiscriminate killings in its report and did not 
provide adequate data on the cluster bombs used during the war). 
 203. See WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 498. (acknowledging, however, 
that its own interpretation would impose further restrictions on the IDF against 
those who use "built-up areas" as a basis of their operations—a method of warfare 
explicitly prohibited by the IHL). 
 204. See Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, 257 (July 8) (“States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of 
means in the weapons they use.”); see Convention Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land art. 23(b), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631("In 
addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially 
forbidden . . . (b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the 
hostile nation or army”; The Secretariat, Respect for Human Rights in Armed 
Conflicts: Existing Rules of International Law Concerning the Prohibition or 
Restriction of Use of Specific Weapons, at ¶ 7, delivered to the United Nations 
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/9215 (Nov. 7, 1973) (explaining that the Martens 
Clause in the Hague Convention is an additional ground for prohibition of 
treacherous or perfidious weapons, referring to the effects of weapons such as 
mines, booby traps, and delayed-action bombs on noncombatants); R.R. Baxter, 
Conventional Weapons Under Legal Prohibitions, 1 INT’L SEC. 42, 47 (1977) 
(noting that the existing law governing the use of prohibited weapons is “archaic 
and excessively general” in character). But see KALSHOVEN, supra note 31, at 237 
(explaining that, in regard to the 1974 Lucerne Conference of Governmental 
Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (“Lucerne Conference”), 
"[t]he prevalent feeling was that the concept did not merit a separate place among 
the legal criteria governing use of conventional weapons”). 
 205. Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, at 257 (stressing that humanitarian law 
was created to eliminate unnecessary harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve 
legitimate military objectives); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 129, at 57 (in 
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Traditionally, it has been argued that CMs are inherently 
indiscriminate as their wide dispersal pattern (known in military 
parlance as ‘footprint’) means that they cannot be targeted against 
military objectives exclusively.206 Employing thus might CMs violate 
Article 51(4)(b) of AP I, which reflects customary IHL regarding 
weapons that cannot be directed at specific military targets.207 
However, when the problem associated with ERW came to the fore, 
the emphasis shifted to the CMs’ inherently high failure rate rather 
than their inaccuracy.208 Under the new emphasis, it was argued that 
since CMs cause casualties after a conflict’s end, then those 
casualties are, in effect, only civilian. Indeed, the ICRC Commentary 
of AP I seems to suggest that unrecorded minefields having mines 
without reliable self-destruct mechanisms violate Article 51(4)(b).209 
 
addition to these two "cardinal principles," it was argued that "the Court identified 
a third fundamental principle: the principle of neutrality, whereby, inter alia, the 
effects of weapons must be contained within the territories of the belligerent 
States.”). But see CHRISTOPHER GREENWOOD, ESSAYS ON WAR IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 252 (2007) (pointing out that it is hard to conceive that "[t]his principle has 
only very limited significance for the use of weapons other than nuclear weapons . 
. ." [and we should add biological ones as well]). 
 206. See Docherty, supra note 182, at 57-61 (documenting that some weapons 
are so difficult to target that they endanger military forces as well as civilian 
populations). 
 207. See, e.g., Hulme, supra note 148, at 173-74 (arguing that inaccurate 
weapons that have little or no guidance systems cannot discriminate effectively 
between military and civilian objects); see also PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 129,  
¶¶ 1956-60; MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED 
CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, 305 (1987) (commenting that the reference in AP 
I 51(4)(b) prohibits “ ‘blind’ weapons which cannot, with any reasonable assurance 
be directed against a military objective.”) 
 208. See, e.g., Hulme, supra note 148, 175-89 (pointing out that natural 
conditions such as wind and marshes are likely to worsen the failure rate of cluster 
bombs); McDonnell, supra note 148, at 79-87 (concluding that, in Serbia and 
Kosovo, the risking of civilian lives was “excessive compared to the non-existent 
military advantage.”); see also Breitegger, supra note 28, at 10 (positing that this 
shift may have been affected by the International Court of Justice’s (“ICJ”) 
acceptance of the nuclear weapons states' reasoning in the Nuclear Weapons Case, 
according to which a weapon is inherently indiscriminate only if its use would 
result in military and civilian casualties in all circumstances: "in line with such 
reasoning, it would seem to be virtually impossible to conclude that any weapon is 
prohibited per se.”). 
 209. See Breitegger, supra note 28, at 13 (noting that untrained civilians would 
be in danger if they handled hidden cluster bombs that remained and that such 
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As one scholar rightly noted: “The dud cluster bomb is virtually 
identical to an unmarked and unmapped mine without [a] modern 
self-destruct mechanism[].”210  
Nevertheless, even in the absence of customary prohibitions on 
CMs, non-CCM member or signatory states employing this weapon 
are still obligated by the customary rule of proportionality to take all 
necessary steps to prevent CMs from indiscriminately causing 
civilian casualties.211 As such, a crucial practical issue is CMs’ post-
conflict effects on the proportionality probe, which balances military 
advantage with civilian impact.212  
According to Article 51(5)(b) of AP I which reflects customary 
IHL, an attack is disproportionate and thus indiscriminate if it “may 
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.”213 While it is understandable that incidental 
 
types of bombings represent the antithesis of trying to require distinguishing 
military and civilian objectives). 
 210. McDonnell, supra note 148, at 80; see PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 129, ¶ 
1959 (requiring that mines laid by aircraft or remote-delivery have recorded 
locations or self-destruct mechanisms); accord BOTHE ET AL., supra note 207, at 
308 (explaining that modern remotely delivered mines have self-destruct 
mechanisms so they are not indiscriminate as to time but that obsolete mines that 
cause casualties may still exist that are indiscriminate as to time). 
 211. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims in an International Armed Conflict (Protocol 
I) Art. 48, 51(4)-(8), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I] 
(requiring use of force that is not indiscriminate and that is limited to legitimate 
military objectives). 
 212. See Breitegger, supra note 28, at 38 (concluding that there is a need for 
states to address long-term civilian losses instead of just short-term losses due to 
the impact of cluster munitions). 
 213. Protocol I, supra note 216, art. 51(5)(b). The proportionality standard is 
also reiterated in reiterated in Article 57(2)(a)(iii). See id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii); see also 
PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 129, ¶¶ 1967-81 (discussing the types of attacks that 
this article contemplated: (1) area bombardment, and (2) those with “excessive 
effects in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”); 
JUDITH GARDEM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY, AND THE USE OF FORCE BY 
STATES 59-84 (2004) (advocating for more legal criteria that bans weapons in the 
interest of international humanitarian law); see also JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & 
LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 306-
13 (2005) (describing specific examples of states that have incorporated customary 
international humanitarian law into their domestic law and military manuals). 
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civilian losses must be reasonably foreseeable, the debate remains 
unresolved as to whether only immediate and short-term civilian 
losses can be reasonably foreseeable without being able to predict 
long-term civilian harm.214  
In light of the unresolved character of the debate, the MAG’s view 
was all but an “extended interpretation.”215 On the contrary, it reflects 
a stance that the ICRC defined as outdated in light of the experience 
gained from the use of CMs and the research conducted into their 
effects.216 As Prof. Christopher Greenwood stated prior to the 2006 
War:  
If . . . cluster weapons are used against military targets in an 
area where there are known to be civilians, then the 
proportionality test may require that account be taken both of 
the risk to the civilians from sub-munitions exploding during 
the attack and of the risk from unexploded sub-munitions in 
the hours immediately after the attack. It is an entirely 
different matter, however, to require that account be taken of 
the longer-term risk posed by ERW, particularly of the risk 
which ERW can pose after a conflict has ended or after 
civilians have returned to an area from which they had 
fled. . . . The proportionality test has to be applied on the 
basis of information reasonably available at the time of the 
attack. The risks posed by ERW once the immediate 
aftermath of an attack has passed are too remote to be capable 
of assessment at that time.217 
 
 214. See Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century 
Warfare, 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143, 168 (1999) (arguing that that the 
debate reflects a change in emphasis as the proportionality test has always included 
after-effects; yet, in the past, only direct effects came to the fore of the discussion). 
 215. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 498. 
 216. See GGE-CCW, Aug. 2-12, 2005, Existing Principles and Rules of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable to Munitions that May Become 
Explosive Remnants of War, at ¶ 20, CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/WP.7 (July 28, 2005) 
[hereinafter GGE-CCW Existing Principles] (adopting the view that using the rule 
of proportionality during planning an attack must include an evaluation of 
foreseeable incidental consequences and the short- and long-term effects of 
submunitions that become Explosive Remnants of War). 
 217. Christopher Greenwood, GGE-CCW, May 21-24, 2002, Legal Issues 
Regarding Explosive Remnants of War, at ¶ 23, CCW/GGE/I/WP.10 (May 23, 
2002) (emphasis added) (observing that, "The degree of that risk turns on too many 
factors which are incapable of assessment at the time of the attack, such as when 
and whether civilians will be permitted to return to an area, what steps the party 
BARAK_AUTHOR CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2010  9:31 AM 
2010] NONE TO BE TRUSTED 473 
However, given the fact that neither the pertinent AP I articles nor 
their history establish any time frame, a growing camp (including 
states,218 the ICRC,219 legal experts,220 former military personnel221 
and NGOs222 basing their opinions on research conducted in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia on the CM’s long-term impacts on 
civilians)223 takes the opposite view.224 Finding support in other 
 
controlling that area will have taken to clear unexploded ordnance, what priority 
that party gives to the protection of civilians and so forth”); see also GGE-CCW, 
Mar. 6-10, 2007, Report on States Parties’ Responses to the Questionnaire on 
International Humanitarian Law & Explosive Remnants of War, 
CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2. Dated 8 March 2005, at ¶ 27, 
CCW/GGE/XII/WG.1/WP.12 (Mar. 24, 2006) (reporting that, based on a 
questionnaire, few states have thought about how the proportionality principle can 
apply to ERWs). 
 218. See MCCORMACK & MTHARU, supra note 187, at 1 (finding that 97% of 
States consider the rule on proportionality relevant with regards to ERW but that a 
more controversial issue is “whether a military commander is required to consider . 
. . longer term harm caused to . . .  civilian population[s] . . . as a result of” the 
proportionality-ERW analysis). 
 219. See GGE-CCW Existing Principles, supra note 216, ¶ 21 (rejecting the 
view that the long term effects of ERW’s proportionality requirement are “not 
reasonably foreseeable to a military commander.”). 
 220. See, e.g., GGE-CCW, Aug. 2-12, 2005, International Humanitarian Law 
Principles and Explosive Remnants of War, at 1 n.1, CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/WP.19 
(Aug. 25, 2005) (confirming the view of Professor Tim McCormack, who agrees 
with imposing requirements for officials to comply with proportionality when 
using weapons that result in ERW); McDonnell, supra note 148, at 80 (pointing 
out that civilians have often been the main victims of dud cluster bombs because of 
their attractive color and size); Wiebe, supra note 152, at 88 (advocating for 
regulation of cluster munitions due to the devastation of NATO’s use of CM’s in 
Serbia and Kosovo); Breitegger, supra note 28, at 17 (asserting that post-conflict 
ERW’s have an impact on civilian populations because casualties happen during 
ordinary activities such as farming, and not just direct handling of the munitions). 
 221. See, e.g., Herthel, supra note 30, at 268 (confirming Major Thomas J. 
Herthel’s view that military personnel should avoid the use thereof near populated 
areas unless there is a “direct military benefit that clearly outweighs the likely 
collateral damage . . . during and after the conflict”). 
 222. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Watch, Cluster Munitions and the Proportionality Test: 
Memorandum to Delegates of the Convention on Conventional Weapons 13 (April 
2008) (proposing a legal instrument that bans “the production, transfer, 
stockpiling, and use of cluster munitions” due to their victimizing of civilians even 
after hostilities are over). 
 223. See, e.g., HANDICAP INT’L, FATAL FOOTPRINT: THE GLOBAL HUMAN 
IMPACT OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS, PRELIMINARY REPORT 44-45 (2006) (noting that 
those long-term consequences include killed and maimed civilians, particularly 
children, which inhibited socio-economic recovery and created a resurgence of 
internal displaced persons and refugees); see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING 
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international weapons instruments concerned with long-term impacts 
as well as the 1996 nuclear weapons case (in which few justices 
addressed long-term impacts), its supporters declared that: “Most in 
the international community now believe that the proportionality 
principle requires consideration of the aftereffects of a weapon, such 
as a cluster munition . . . . “225 
Given this state of affairs, when the Winograd Commission stated 
that “the most important issue at hand: the use of CMs must also take 
into account the injuries caused by duds, long after the actual firing, 
and in some cases even after the end of the war,” 226 it significantly 
contributed to the case for the CCM or, at least, to formulating a 
prohibition against the use of CMs in and near populated areas. The 
Commission had, in effect, defined any CM strike on a populated 
area as indiscriminate under IHL.227 Given Israel’s position as a 
prominent CM weapons producer (60 million M-85 bomblets by 
2002 in addition to license agreements with companies across the 
globe), exporter (through artillery shells)228 and, most importantly, a 
heavy user (notably in 1973, 1978, 1982, and 2006), such a statement 
from an official commission should not be underestimated.  
 
SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 49-82 (exposing the fact that many civilians 
returned to their homes in Lebanon after hostilities ended, unaware of submunition 
duds that were in their vicinity). 
 224. See Breitegger, supra note 28, at 14-19 (discussing the debate over whether 
long-term effects should be required to be taken into account as one that is about 
the subjective assessment of expected civilian losses and not actual civilian losses). 
 225. HUM. RTS. WATCH, CLUSTER MUNITIONS, supra note 227, at 12 (noting 
that the number of authorities who support this position is growing and that they 
contend that the use of CM’s in populated areas can almost always be expected to 
cause civilian losses that are “excessive in relation to the . . . military advantage 
anticipated). 
 226. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 495 (emphasis in original). 
 227. See Responses to Questionnaire, supra note 222, at 19 (explaining that the 
exception is in cases when the military, which should bear the burden of proof, is 
able to show that the military advantage of this particular strike outweighed the 
civilian harm). As one response to the 2005-2006 survey stated: "The greater the 
importance of the military target, the greater the collateral damage allowed.”  Id. 
 228. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 27 
(naming Israel as a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions through Israel 
Military Industries (“IMI”), which is a government-owned weapons manufacturer). 
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CONCLUSION 
Above all, the 2006 Israeli use of CMs suggests that IHL’s general 
principles are inadequate per se at preventing improper use of the 
weapon.229 Hence, a shift of attention is required away from the 
weapon’s effects (primarily disproportionate civilian casualties) 
toward the weapon itself, as the CCM does. Nothing more is needed 
than Israel’s insistence, justified or not, that CM use in the Second 
Lebanon War generally accorded with IHL to indicate that the 
existing law demands urgent remedy. Considering the number of 
possessor states that adopted the CCM by May 2008, the fact 
remains that some forty states possessing CMs still prefer to remain 
outside the purview of the Convention; as such, those states are 
bound solely by the general principles of IHL, and future improper 
massive use of CMs might be just a matter of time.230 
Yet, a treaty over this specific weapon has existed since December 
2008.231 Although the issue of when it will enter into force is still an 
open question, the issue currently on the agenda is not whether 
specific rules on CMs should be devised to remedy the existing law 
but, rather, whether an absolute ban on use, possession, and so forth 
was needed.232 Could use restrictions fill the gaps in existing law, as 
the United States claims?  
Within this more limited framework, the 2006 case seems to 
support the ban model for three fundamental reasons going beyond 
the various shortcomings in the CM Draft Protocol addressed in this 
article. After all, some of the flaws in the current draft, important as 
they are, could be eliminated to some extent. It is also quite possible 
 
 229. Cf. id. at 24-25, 129-30 (concluding that use of cluster munitions binds 
states to minimize civilian harm, and that while Israel had made efforts to do so, it 
is still responsible for the suffering that it caused). 
 230. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, CLUSTER MUNITION INFORMATION CHART (2009), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/17/cluster-munition-
information-chart (naming countries, such as Iraq and Syria, that use cluster 
weapons but are not parties to the treaty and thus not subject to the treaty’s specific 
principles). 
 231. See States Adopting the Convention on Cluster Munitions, supra note 1 
(reporting that 107 countries adopted the convention on May 30, 2008). 
 232. See Suzanne Tice, Cluster Munitions: The Ban Process, J. OF MINE 
ACTION, Summer 2008, available at http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/12.1/sp/tice/ 
tice.htm (summarizing the efforts to ban CMs and noting that certain countries 
wanted to have exceptions to the ban). 
BARAK_AUTHOR CHECK_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2010  9:31 AM 
476 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:423 
that the draft may not obtain the required consensus and be removed 
from the CCW agenda.233 In that case, however, the CCM opponents’ 
contention that a total ban is an extreme measure compared to the 
previous restrictions (which allegedly could have allowed them to 
join while simultaneously addressing the respective humanitarian 
concerns) will gain much attention. Thus, the question becomes 
whether a modest model such as that embodied in Protocol III of the 
CCW on Incendiary Weapons (i.e., use of weapons is allowed only 
when special protection is given to civilian populations)234 can 
properly address future humanitarian crises.  
The first and the most important reason for supporting the ban 
model embodied in the CCM is that, as Lesson Five indicates, Israel 
not only uses CMs, but also that its use of this weapon in the field is 
uncontrolled.235 On the one hand, approximately 4,000 rockets hit 
Israel’s civilian population, with an average of 100 rockets launched 
daily, while on the other, more than 173,000 artillery projectiles and 
rockets were fired on South Lebanon, mainly to prevent first 
firings.236 Under the circumstances of the Second Lebanon War, one 
 
 233. See id. (pointing out that some states, such as the United States and Russia, 
will not agree to a strict approach to CMs). 
 234. See Hays Parks, The Protocol on Incendiary Weapons, 279 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 535, 550 (1990) (tracing the drafting history of the Protocol on Incendiary 
Weapons and concluding that there should also be rules for internal armed 
conflicts also); see also David P. Fidler, The Use of White Phosphorous Munitions 
By U.S. Military Forces in Iraq, ASIL INSIGHTS, Dec. 6, 2005, available at 
http://www.asil.org/insights051206.cfm (citing the international outcry whenever 
possible violations arise such as in the case of the U.S. use of phosphorous in 
Fallujah and Israel’s use of the same in Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip); 
UN Accuses Israel Over Phosphorous, BBC NEWS, Jan. 15, 2009, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7831424.stm (noting that white phosphorus 
sticks to human skin and burns to the bone, causing death or wounds that heal 
slowly); Amos Harel, IDF Probes Improper Use of Phosphorous Shells in Gaza 
Strip, HAARETZ, Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1057361. 
html (reporting two incidents after a probe of improper phosphorous use: a strike 
on a UNRWA school bus that killed 42 Palestinians and a friendly fire event that 
killed two soldiers). See also Parks, supra note 249, at 544 (explaining that since 
white phosphorus is used extensively for marking and screening purposes, it was 
excluded from consideration as an incendiary). 
 235. HUM. RTS. WATCH, CLUSTER MUNITIONS, supra note 227, at 13 
(concluding that a ban on all cluster munitions would best prevent future violations 
of international humanitarian law). 
 236. Cf. HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 40-
41 (confirming Israel’s likely use of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks.) 
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might even retrospectively conclude that this exaggeration was 
unavoidable; yet, it was also too extreme to support any of the 
offered models.  
However, during the war, politicians and IDF commanders alike 
were accompanied by an unprecedented number of legal advisers.237 
As Israel’s AG Mazuz detailed before the Winograd Commission, 
legal advisers from the MAG’s office were present at all military 
decision-making forums (e.g., targets and sorties approval), 
including the Northern Command, the IAF, the Navy, and the 
General Staff.238 In fact, the legal accompaniment reached such a 
level that the Winograd Commission itself could not but ask 
“whether such an intense level of legal advising in real time is indeed 
desirable.”239  
Given the fact that the extensive use took place under such 
conditions,240 it appears that only the total elimination of CMs can 
prevent repetition of such practices in the next intensive conflict 
engaged in by CM-possessing states. As long as CMs remain integral 
parts of military arsenals, their highly perceived military utility, 
despite their gradual ineffectiveness as indicated by the Sixth Lesson 
above, legal advisers will labor to approve rather than prevent CM 
deployment in populated areas.241 
The second reason for supporting the ban model is related to the 
1976 Bilateral End-Use Agreement between Israel and the United 
States. Due to this agreement, Israel faces severe restrictions on its 
 
 237. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 498; cf. Israeli Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, supra note 204, ¶ 251 (confirming that legal advisors are always present 
when the IDF makes decisions). 
 238. Mazuz to Winograd: IDF Acted in Accordance with International Law, 
supra note 96. 
 239. WINOGRAD REPORT, supra note 24, at 488. 
 240. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 40-
41 (documenting Israel’s extensive bombing campaign). 
 241. See Yotam Feldman & Uri Blau, Consent and Advise, HAARETZ, Feb. 5, 
2009, available  at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1059925.html (reporting 
that an officer in the International Law Division, the IDF MAG's Office, was 
quoted after the December 2008-January 2009 Cast Lead Operation as saying: 
"Our goal is not to fetter the army, but to give it the tools to win in a lawful 
manner," and also reporting that Prof. Orna Ben-Naftali even stated:  "Today, this 
discipline [international law] is utilized only to justify the use of force . . . Instead 
of legal advice and international humanitarian law minimizing suffering, they 
legitimize the use of force."). 
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use of CMs, restrictions which are much more stringent and specific 
than the rules entered into the CM Draft Protocol to prevent future 
IHL violations.242 While an assessment of the diplomatic 
entanglement caused in the wake of the 2006 War is beyond the 
scope of this article,243 we can state in a nutshell that one of the 
conditions to be met when resorting to U.S.-made CM use is 
stipulation of “military, fortified targets.”244 
While it is doubtful that Israel’s use of U.S.-made CMs (to be 
differentiated from a few cases of improper targeting) did violate the 
Agreement’s terms, the crucial fact is that use restrictions, albeit 
from a bilateral rather than a multilateral source, did nothing to 
prevent the humanitarian crisis.245 There can be little hope, therefore, 
 
 242. See GGE-CCW, Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions, supra note 17, art. 3 
(providing for the protection of civilians, the civilian population, and civilian 
objects). In fact, while even earlier drafts (e.g., July and October 2008), which 
contained up to nine paragraphs on IHL, were criticized as "merely regulat[ing] the 
weapon and . . . not go[ing] far enough to minimize humanitarian harm," see 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 17, at 4 (reviewing the July 
2008 draft), in the latest draft (November 2009), there are only two paragraphs 
reiterating IHL. The paragraphs state that in implementing this Protocol, members 
which are parties to an armed conflict "shall ensure full compliance" with all 
applicable principles and rules of IHL and that nothing in it "shall be interpreted as 
detracting from, or otherwise prejudicing," other principles and rules of IHL. GGE-
CCW, Draft Protocol on Cluster Munitions, supra note 17, art. 3. 
 243. For a review of the entire affair as well as the agreement's origins, history 
and diplomatic crises caused over the use of U.S-made CMs by Israel see Barak, 
supra note 93. 
 244. See Don Oberdorfer, Cluster Bomb Curb Sought in Mideast; U.S. Asks 
Israel to Tighten Curbs On Deadly Cluster Bomb Units, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 
1978, at A1 (reporting that one of the conditions sought was that field commanders 
would not use the weapons without decisions made by politically responsible 
superiors); see also David S. Cloud, Inquiry Opened into Israeli Use of U.S. 
Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006, at A1 (describing that the first sales of 
weapons occurred in the 1970’s but were never publicly confirmed); RICHARD 
MOYES & THOMAS NASH, CLUSTER MUNITIONS IN LEBANON 9 (Simon Conway 
ed., 2005) (summarizing the conditions imposed as: “only for defensive purposes, 
against fortified military targets, and only if attacked by two or more ‘Arab 
states.’”). 
 245. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLOODING SOUTH LEBANON, supra note 63, at 17 
(urging the United States to stop supplying most of the cluster munitions and other 
weapons that Israel used in Lebanon due to the civilian casualties); see also Mark 
Tran, US Studies Israel’s Cluster Bomb Use in Lebanon, GUARDIAN, Jan. 29, 
2007, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jan/29/israelandthepalestinians.usa (noting 
that the United States had begun an investigation into whether Israel had violated 
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that a different restriction model coming from within or outside the 
CCW framework will have greater effect on Israel should it join (and 
certainly should it abstain from joining) a would-be protocol on 
CMs. 
The third, somewhat less urgent reason refers to an argument 
commonly used by CCM supporters: the concern that CM 
proliferation beyond current possessor states will “include . . . non-
state actors.”246 Moreover, as one CMC co-chair stated, if even a 
small portion of the billions of sub-munitions currently in world 
arsenals get used, “they could make the landmine crisis pale in 
comparison.”247 In this respect, the Second Lebanon War proved that 
such proliferation is already here: Although not addressed by the 
current article, there is conclusive evidence of CM use248 by 
Hezbollah during the war.249 Hezbollah’s use, which inflicted one 
 
usage agreements while using the cluster bombs in 2006). 
 246. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, STAYING TRUE TO THE BAN ON CLUSTER 
MUNITIONS 5 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/06/22/stay 
ing-true-ban-cluster-munitions (advocating broad language in international law 
that prevents states or companies from assisting non-state actors from acquiring aid 
for CM’s or using them). 
 247. Steve Goose, Dir., Arms Div., Hum. Rts. Watch, Cluster Munitions: 
Statement to the Canadian Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
International Development (Mar. 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/03/01/cluster-munitions-statement-canadian-
standing-committee-foreign-affairs-and-internat (“We believe that the military 
utility of cluster munitions has been overstated while the military dangers . . . have 
been understated.”). 
 248. See Press Release, Hum. Rts. Watch, Lebanon/Israel: Hezbollah Hit Israel 
with Cluster Munitions During Conflict, Oct. 18, 2006, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/10/18/lebanonisrael-hezbollah-hit-israel-cluster-
munitions-during-conflict (documenting Hezbollah’s use of 118 Chinese-made 
Type-81 122mm unguided rockets containing 39 bomblets each. These bomblets 
(called Type-90s or MZDs) are dual-purpose: Once they explode on impact for a 
blast effect, they fragment into hundreds of steel spheres about 3.5 mm in diameter 
over a wide area. [A reliable HDR for these bomblets is unavailable]); see also 
Mine Action Info. Ctr. at James Madison Univ., Munitions Reference, 
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/supplemental/munitions/munitions.asp (last visited 
May 14, 2010) (providing lists of different types of weapons and their functions). 
 249. See, e.g., Press Release, Hum. Rts. Watch, supra note 252. (noting that the 
Israeli government was reluctant to confirm Hezbollah CM attacks because of 
security concerns); see also Hezbollah Used Cluster Bombs, Groups Asserts, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2006, at A10 (citing the Human Rights Watch report on 
Hezbollah’s CM use and reporting that three civilians were injured in a particular 
attack in July near Maghar). 
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death and twelve injuries in Israel, provides an additional incentive 
to ban CMs or, at least impose heavy restrictions on their transfer.250  
Indeed, historically, banning a weapon has not guaranteed its total 
destruction.251 Regardless of the intrusiveness of the legal instrument 
applied, states can always develop and/or maintain a hidden 
arsenal.252 Banning does ensure, however, that the banned weapon is, 
at minimum, outside the reach of regular combat units when a bitter 
conflict erupts, making it impossible for the alleged arsenal to be 
used other than as a last resort. 
As to those states deciding to refrain from joining the CCM, its 
very existence may strongly reinforce or generate an international 
norm prohibiting CMs. Through de-legitimization, that norm will 
affect non-CCM members before they resort to large-scale use of 
CMs, especially against targets in populated areas. The constructivist 
literature has already demonstrated (for example, in reference to 
chemical weapons and anti-personnel landmines) that international 
treaties, or even deliberation about international treaties, on some 
categories of weapons can result in their stigmatization.253  
 
 250. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, CIVILIANS UNDER ASSAULT: HEZBOLLAH’S 
ROCKET ATTACKS ON ISRAEL IN THE 2006 WAR 44-46 (Aug. 2007) (providing that 
the death and 12 injuries are confirmed through police reports along with police 
reports confirming bombs landing in Haifa); Alia Ibrahim, Report Accuses 
Hezbollah of Indiscriminate Attacks on Civilians in ‘06 War, WASH. POST, Aug. 
30, 2007, at A15 (reporting that Hezbollah and the Lebanese government strongly 
condemned the Human Rights Watch report.) Due to the attention devoted to 
Israeli use of CMs, the implications of Hezbollah’s use were almost totally 
ignored.  
 251. See CCM, supra note 2, art. 3(6) (permitting possession of a limited 
number of CMs and explosive sub-munitions for the development of and training 
in CM and explosive sub-munition detection, clearance, or destruction, and 
development of CM counter-measures). 
 252. See, e.g., Ken Alibek & Stephen Handelman, Biohazard: The Chilling 
Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World-Told from 
the Inside By the Man Who Ran It (1999) (considering the Iraqi case regarding 
nuclear weapons and the Soviet case regarding biological weapons and remarking, 
"[o]ver a twenty-year period that began, ironically, with Moscow's endorsement of 
the Biological Weapons Convention [BWC] in 1972, the Soviet Union [one of the 
three BWC depository states] built the largest and most advanced biological 
warfare establishment in the world."). 
 253. See Richard Price & Nina Tannenwald, Norms and Deterrence: The 
Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS 114-52 (Peter J. Katzenstein 
ed., 1996) (providing a succinct analysis of the chemical weapons case and 
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CCM supporters have openly stated that they hope that such 
stigmatization will occur with CMs.254 In 1996, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), while 
reviewing a case in which CM rockets (Orkan M-87)255 were fired 
into Zagreb, noted that there was nothing in IHL formally forbidding 
the use of CMs as such.256 A decade later, many states still perceive 
CMs as legitimate although the winds have changed.257 As the AP 
mines case (which inspired the participants of the Oslo Process) 
indicates, delegitimization will eventually occur.258 In a move which 
 
commenting that the most important effect of international taboos is that they 
delegitimize weapons and the practice of self-help);  Richard Price, Reversing the 
Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines, 52 INT’L ORGS. 613, 
640 (1998) (analyzing the process prior to the entry into force of the treaty on AP 
landmines and concluding that new norms regarding landmines are likely to affect 
policymakers’ decisions); BRIAN RAPPERT, A CONVENTION BEYOND THE 
CONVENTION: STIGMA, HUMANITARIAN STANDARDS AND THE OSLO PROCESS 8-9 
(Richard Moyes ed., 2008) [hereinafter RAPPERT, A CONVENTION BEYOND THE 
CONVENTION] (summarizing the recent studies on this case and explaining that de-
legitimization helps countries make progress regarding regulation of landmines 
even if they are not state parties to any Conventions). 
 254. See Minister Micheál Martin, Statement at Closing Ceremony of the Dublin 
Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions (May 30, 2008), available at 
http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/Ireland.pdf (“[E]even though we all 
know that there are important states not present, I am also convinced that together 
we will have succeeded in stigmatizing any future use of cluster munitions.”). 
 255. See JANE’S AMMUNITION HANDBOOK 660 (Anthony G. Williams & Leland 
Ness eds., 14th ed. 2006) (providing weapon specifications). 
 256. See Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-R61, Decision, ¶ 18 
(Mar. 8, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe11/R61/960308IT.htm 
(finding, however, that the specific rocket used was an indiscriminate weapon; 
Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶ 463, 468 (June 12, 
2007), available at  http://www.un.org/icty/martic/trialc/judgement/mar-
tcjud070612e.pdf (holding that Martić, the former political leader of Croatian 
Serbs, ordered, inter alia, the shelling of Zagreb on May 2-3, 1995.); see also 
Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Public Judgment, ¶ 252 (Oct. 8, 
2008), available at http://www.un.org/icty/martic/appeal/ judgment/mar-
aj081008e.pdf (dismissing the appeal and confirming the sentence while sustaining 
the Trial Chamber's finding that the M-87 Orkan—as used under the circumstances 
of the case—was an indiscriminate weapon and that Martić knew of the effects of 
this weapon when he ordered the shelling). 
 257. See Tice, supra note 232 (reporting that the United States and Russia have 
historically been opposed to banning cluster bombs although they seem to be 
leaning towards favoring regulation). 
 258. See Editorial, Cluster Bombs, Made in America, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008, 
at 11 (commenting on the U.S. administration’s opposition to the CCM but also 
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bears important implications for the current debate over the 
weapons’ legitimacy, Hezbollah Lebanese MP Hassan Hoballah, 
although refusing to address specific queries regarding whether 
Hezbollah indeed used CMs, stated in an interview with the BBC 
that: “We did not use these bombs . . . [w]e reject the use of these 
bombs anywhere in the world because they hurt civilians, especially 
when dropped on residential areas. Our stance is consistent. It can 
never change.”259  
 This development has not been overlooked by CCM 
opponents260 and—as many supporters believe—provides an 
important impetus to concluding the Draft Protocol. Yet, while the 
CCM seeks to delegitimize this weapon, the would-be effect of the 
Draft Protocol is exactly diametrical.261 This is the core of the 
dispute. In light of the perceived effectiveness of the CM (especially 
in comparison with the one attributed to AP landmines) a prolonged 
battle is expected. As the Head of the U.S. delegation assiduously 
clarified during the November 2008 session of the GGE on CMs: 
“Again, let me be perfectly clear here, on the 4th of December, after 
the signing ceremony of Oslo, cluster munitions will still remain as 
lawful and legitimate weapons.”262 
Finally, it is hard to find more favorable circumstances for 
responsible use of CMs than a professionally trained and modern 
 
saying, "At least this treaty, like the land-mine ban, will stigmatize cluster 
munitions and make it harder to use them"); RAPPERT, A CONVENTION BEYOND 
THE CONVENTION, supra note 253, at 3 (mentioning NATO’s policy of no-use of 
CMs in Afghanistan as evidence of other efforts made to avoid CM usage); Borrie, 
supra note 7, (using Brazil’s review of its national positions with a view to joining 
the CCM as an example of progress). 
 259. Hezbollah Denies Cluster Bomb Use, BBC NEWS, Oct. 19, 2006, available 
at   http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/ 6068154.stm; see HUM. RTS. WATCH, 
CLUSTER BOMBS IN AFGHANISTAN: A HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH BACKGROUNDER 2 
(Oct. 2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2001/10/31/cluster-bombs-
afghanistan (pointing out that the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and the Serb 
militia in Croatia, see supra note 258, have used CMs as well.) 
 260. See Peter Beaumont, Obama Takes U.S. Closer to Total Ban on Cluster 
Bombs, GUARDIAN, Mar. 13, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2009/mar/13/us-national-security-obama-administration/print (noting that 
Obama signed a new law making it virtually impossible to sell the weapons). 
 261. See id. (stating that the United States will still continue to use cluster 
weapons even though Obama had seemingly made progress on its ban). 
 262. Mathias, supra note 54. 
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army that has legal advisors, knowledgeable in IHL and weighing in 
on each relevant decision. In fact, as AG Mazuz stated before the 
Winograd Commission: “It was the most legislated war in the history 
of Israel, maybe the world.”263 If a loss of control transpired even in 
such favorable circumstances, it seems that no country is to be 
trusted with the proper use of CMs once it becomes involved in a 
bitter military conflict. The failure of Israel’s intensive legal control 
of military operations during the Second Lebanon War to provide 
adequate protection to Lebanese civilians should warn us that many 
more cases of severe post-conflict civilian harm will occur in the 
absence of strong, viable use prohibition. However, these will 
probably, as the Sixth Lesson on the ineffectiveness of CMs in this 
War suggests above, be of no avail whatsoever.  
 
 
 263. Mazuz to Winograd: IDF Acted in Accordance with International Law, 
supra note 96; see Yuval Azoulay, Mazuz: Ample Legal Advice During War, 
HAARETZ, Oct. 17, 2009, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt. 
jhtml?itemNo=936011 (asserting that there was enough legal advice in officers’ 
deliberations before military operations). 
